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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
During the 1980s, in what is sometimes referred to as ‘the lost decade’1, an 
extensive project of social and economic transformation gripped sub-Saharan Africa. 
The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) – comprising the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – sought to address a perceived ‘developmental 
crisis’ through reform designed to reconfigure African political economies and 
integrate them further within an increasingly globalised structure of production and 
accumulation (Chase-Dunn, 1998: xviii; Easterley, 2005: 1). Since the turn of the 
Millennium these reforms have been complemented with a developmental paradigm 
focussed on the process of poverty reduction and the role of governance, as both State 
and market-led strategies have failed to significantly improve the livelihoods of most 
Africans (World Bank, 1997: iii). Sub-Saharan governments and their citizens are in 
the throes of a global project which pursues the “transformation of society” and the 
re-interpretation of accumulation, social reproduction and democratic representation 
according to World Bank development policy (Stiglitz, 1999: 582 cited in Harrison, 
2004: 3).  
 
In this context, the mandate of the World Bank has been transformed from the 
provision of loans for post-war reconstruction into one of “ending extreme poverty 
and promoting shared prosperity” worldwide (World Bank, 2013: 7; Stiglitz, 1999: 
577).  The World Bank is directly implicated in the governance of 39 nations under 
the heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative, affecting over a billion of the 
world’s poorest (Quattri & Fosu, 2012: 2). With 36 of these countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the region is at the centre of the latest phase of a “wider historical Liberalism” 
in development theory, a project with a long history “of promising relief from poverty 
to those who respected, above all, the rule of law, and the property rights of the 
powerful” (Craig & Porter, 2006: 7; Sheppard & Leitner, 2010: 189). 
 
                                                        
1 This term describes the period between 1980 and 1990 in which African countries experienced drastic 
increases in absolute poverty and declining social indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy 
and educational attainment (Easterley, 2001: 135; Aina, 1993: 11). 
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The division of labour between the IFIs was redefined in 1998. The IMF was 
designated to macroeconomic policy prescriptions and “growth oriented stabilisation 
policies”, while the World Bank was given an expanded mandate to “compose and 
approve development programmes and priorities, including structural and sectoral 
policies” (Wolfensohn, 1998: 5, 8). The World Bank is, therefore, the institutional 
locus for contesting and reconciling the contradiction between the exploitative 
relations and exigencies of global accumulation circuits, and the stability and 
prosperity required to improve the livelihoods of the world’s poorest (Robinson, 
2012: 359). The unique position of the World Bank has stimulated intense debate 
regarding its role in protecting and enhancing the lives of the poor in Africa within the 
milieu of ‘neoliberal’ globalised capitalism2 (Kyung-Sup et al, 2012: 270; Taylor & 
Nel, 2002: 163).  
 
An extensive range of professional, academic and non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) publications exist on different aspects of this debate. The publications of the 
World Bank and NGOs acknowledge persistent poverty. However, analysis of 
policies per se is, typically, eschewed in favour of identifying technical difficulties in 
the implementation of reform policies or specific avenues for progress articulated in 
World Development Reports. Furthermore, there is often a selective “appeal to 
relatively new and untested research as hard evidence that [the Bank’s] preferred 
policies work” (Deaton et al, 2006: 6; Elson & Catagay, 2000: 1350). From this 
literature, several progressive re-constitutions of the World Bank’s development 
strategy have been promoted including ‘pro-poor accountability’, ‘good governance’ 
and the participation of civil society (Ravillion, 2004: 1; Woods, 2000: 824; World 
Bank, 2013a: 11). The emergence of these objectives in the poverty reduction 
parlance has achieved only marginal improvements in holistic poverty indices, 
constrained as they are by the modus operandi of capitalism in Africa. 
 
The PRS conflates market liberalisation with a range of human capital and ‘safety net’ 
provisions, designed to promote the active participation of the poor in the “inclusive 
                                                        
2 This thesis recognises the capitalist materialist basis of the phenomena described as ‘globalisation’, 
which is often presented as a depoliticised and disingenuous way to refer to the spread of capitalism 
throughout the world (Gimenez, 2004: 86). The thesis also acknowledges that while globalisation is not 
a new phenomenon, the prefix ‘neoliberal’ is added to identify the most recent phase of globalised 
social relations between capital and labour (Bourdieu, 2003: 50). 
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world economy” (World Bank, 2002: 155). Indeed, the institutional framework that 
facilitates this globalised regime is sometimes equated to ‘development’ itself 
(Rodrik, 2001: 34). The PRS pursues the extension of formalised capitalist production 
and exchange, and a persistent openness to capital flows as a means by which savings 
and foreign exchange constraints on growth can be overcome (Cousins et al, 2005: 1). 
Under this model, African political economies with a stable environment for 
investment would always attract the foreign capital to cover ‘resource gaps’ which 
characterise a neo-classical interpretation of underdevelopment (Easterley, 2006: 289; 
du Toit & Moolman, 2004: 647). 
 
The mainstream academic literature regarding the World Bank’s role in sub-Saharan 
development overlooks the contingent structural and material roots of Africa’s present 
position in the global economy (Simon, 1989: 68). There is an unquestioned 
assumption in orthodox research that there is no fundamental contradiction between 
the pursuit of ‘inclusion, empowerment and security’ for impoverished communities 
and the World Bank’s developmental strategy. However, the strategy exposes the very 
same population to the exigencies of internationally competitive labour markets, 
conditioning domestic structures of production that prioritise the exploitation of 
African labour and export of basic commodities (Cornwall & Brock, 2005: 1050; 
Bernstein, 1998, 3) The structural disarticulations of African political economies also 
remain under-theorised. Extant studies engage with the Bank’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) in their own terms and critique particular design and implementation 
failings, rather than problematising the ‘inclusive’, depoliticised strategy to transform 
African social relations and governance itself (Lange, 2008: 1122). 
 
Given the widespread acceptance of its theoretical and methodological principles, it is 
important to critically reflect upon the assumptions and implications of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy in Africa. The vast majority of extant scholarship accepts World 
Bank policy as a pragmatic, politically neutral response to the remote and inexorable 
force of globalised capitalism (Williamson, 1997: 119; Chen & Ravallion, 2004: 141).  
The emphasis of these studies is on the ‘effectiveness’ of poverty reduction policies 
and the relationship between the World Bank and its debtors (Driscoll & Evans, 2005: 
5; Dijkstra, 2005: 443). While many analyses have sought to more adequately 
incorporate the structural position of the World Bank and IMF as the central 
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institutions for the orchestration of capitalism in the developing world, they typically 
investigate how the hegemony of global capitalism impacts upon African political 
economies, with a polemic historical foundation of ‘Africans as victims’ (e.g. 
Easterley, 2009: 26; Stewart & Wang, 2004: 290). By focussing exclusively on the 
hegemonic role of the World Bank in re-constituting social relations and governance 
such analyses exclude or conceal the dialectics that determine how these policies are 
experienced in African political economies. Conclusions that arise from these studies 
overlook the historical foundations of capitalism in the region and the milieu that 
determines the social relations and governance in African societies (Harrisson, 2004: 
53; Cooper, 1993: 83). Finally, an appreciation of the multiplicity and disparity of 
social formations in Africa is largely absent from critical development literature, 
which typically applies broad regional brushstrokes or considers individual instances 
with limited reference to the wider implications for African development as a whole 
(Marais, 2001: 83).  
 
To extend this scholarship, the incremental adjustments of policy design, 
implementation and conditionality must be conceptualised within the broader 
conjuncture of production relations and uneven development that are essential to the 
continuation of global capitalism (Robinson, 2004: 2). To this end, this thesis 
combines an understanding of the essential relations and historical tendencies of the 
capitalist dominated social formation, with an appreciation of the contingencies and 
contestation that inform its structure and purpose. Following the conceptions of 
poverty and development from the Marxist tradition – comprising ‘neo-Marxist’ 
structuralism and world-systems theory – this thesis views the PRS as a dynamic 
process orchestrated by the World Bank to facilitate the accumulation of capital 
within a social framework of alleviating poverty and promoting ‘development’.  
While traditional Marxism considered development in a uni-linear progression of 
stages (Marx, 1976: xvii), more contemporary theories conceptualise ‘capitalist 
development’ as being conditioned by relations of production, commodity chains, 
divisions of labour and geo-political relationships operating at a global scale (Klak, 
2008: 121; Desai & Potter, 2014: 107). Such a Marxian understanding of Africa’s 
peripheralisation within the global social structure of accumulation provides a 
framework through which to interpret the embeddedness of the PRS in broader 
political and economic processes, and its failure to significantly improve the 
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livelihoods of the impoverished in Africa (Arrighi, 1979: 161; Wallerstein & Martin, 
1979: 193). 
 
Understanding the apparent contradiction in the intentions and methodology of the 
World Bank, through a political economy analysis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
in the African periphery constitutes the main objective of this research. The thesis 
comprises a theoretical, historical, institutional and empirical examination of the PRS 
and the wider political-economic context of underdevelopment in Africa. The liberal 
development paradigm which informs the PRS is multi-faceted, but centred around a 
handful of principles aligned with the market as a means of efficient distribution 
(Gore, 2000: 789). The principles are logically sequential, describing enhanced 
‘market opportunity’ for the poor, to be administered under a rubric of ‘good 
governance’, designed to facilitate ‘inclusion’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘security’ (Porter 
& Craig, 2004: 413; Bevan et al, 1991). Among these terms, ‘inclusion’ is the most 
prevalent and contradictory, with its meaning underpinned by the process of 
integration into the global capitalist economy (Bwalya et al, 2004: 4). Despite a 
revision of the objectives, method, and reception of poverty reduction efforts, the 
foundational logic of the PRS remains the “entanglement of all peoples in the net of 
the world market, and, with this the growth of the international character of the 
capitalist regime” (Marx, 1976: 536). 
 
Two further concepts are worth elucidating here. First, the Marxian emphasis on the 
“state of flux” facilitates an analysis which transcends static or binary conceptions of 
the demographic and migratory transitions which characterise contemporary Africa 
(Engels, 1890: 1). Both a synchronic and diachronic perspective are necessary to 
conceptualise the manner in which social formations are organised and re-organised 
according to domestic class relations, the vicissitudes of the international market or 
the reform of the IFIs (Obeng-Odoom, 2013: 152). The extent of capitalist relations in 
sub-Saharan Africa, which is characterised by ‘enclaves’ of productive enterprises 
supported by migratory informal labour and rural communal agriculture, necessitates 
a perspective of dynamism and contingency as well as an acknowledgment of the 
empirical specificity inherent to a culturally and geographically diverse sub-continent  
(Bertocchi & Canova, 2002: 1851; Cox & Negi, 2010: 80). 
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Second, a structural approach situates sub-Saharan Africa in the periphery of a 
globalised social structure of accumulation, with the World Bank and IMF as the 
principal institutions of the orchestration and governance of international capitalism 
(Arrighi, 1979: 163; Cammack, 2007: 191). Following Brenner (1977), this view is 
premised on the primacy of production relations rather than undue emphasis on the 
sphere of exchange evident in the IFI approach. The World Bank’s discursive and 
programmatic rhetoric to reduce poverty obfuscates the fact that liberalised market 
reform serves to exacerbate the disarticulations of Africa’s political economies and 
perpetuate, rather than address, the existing impediments to growth and improved 
livelihoods (Harrison, 2004: 4; Grindle, 2004: 527). 
 
This thesis provides an alternative engagement with the development agenda of the 
World Bank. It investigates the trajectory of IFI policy since the 1980s inclusive of 
the relations of globalised capitalism which are reflected and reproduced within that 
trajectory (Zack-Williams et al, 2006: 501; Gilpin, 2011: 9). Central to the analysis is 
a critical engagement with the key policy mechanism: the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS). This thesis problematises the logic and methodology of the PRS as well as the 
assumptions which inform its approach to African political economies. It argues that 
the PRS has failed to substantially deliver on its expressed goal of poverty reduction 
in Africa because it pursues a strategy of capitalist accumulation that is antithetical to 
improving the livelihoods of the poor. In doing so, the PRS fails to accurately identify 
the impediments to accumulation, enhanced productivity and increased representation 
posed by the historically specific conditions of the African context. The scope and 
argument of the thesis is developed over four chapters.   
 
Chapter One delivers a constructive though critical engagement with the progression 
of IFI policy in Africa since the 1980s. This account contextualises the theoretical 
foundations and contestations that inform the World Bank’s contemporary strategy 
(Birdsall & Londoño, 1997: 34; Stiglitz, 1999: 580). The chapter argues that the 
‘reform triumvirate’ of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation has been a 
pervasive factor of ‘development’ policy from the much-maligned Structural 
Adjustment Policies to the most recent incarnation of the PRS (Rodrik, 2006: 974). 
Foregrounding this continuity demonstrates the reproduction of past failings in 
successive strategies for reducing poverty in Africa, and facilitates a deeper 
 7 
understanding of the World Bank and IMF as institutions that orchestrate and 
legitimise the extension of global accumulation circuits in the developing world 
(Taylor, 2005: 153; Cammack, 2002: 36). The chapter concludes that the 
‘comprehensive’ facets of the PRS are subsumed into a broader logic of integration, 
which aligns African economies with the norms and practices of the globalised 
structure of accumulation (Cammack, 2004: 193; Rückert, 2006: 36). 
 
Chapter Two builds on these insights and problematises the ‘rhetorical’ pillars of the 
PRS: inclusivity, empowerment and security. These concepts are identified with the 
predominance of international market structures over substantive reform to reduce 
poverty. First, ‘inclusivity’ is re-interpreted as a logic of integration for African 
political economies into peripheral relations within the international market 
(Prempeh, 2006: 85; O’Brien, 2000 46, 188). Second, ‘empowerment’ of national 
governments through ‘country ownership’ and ‘good governance’ provides the 
impetus for the transformation of relations of governance in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Third, the chapter identifies the contradictions inherent in the PRS’s promotion of 
‘security’ for the poor in the context of a commodified regime of social reproduction 
and the promotion of ‘human capital’ to facilitate participation in the international 
labour market. The chapter concludes that the rhetorical pillars of the PRS are a 
vehicle to mediate, legitimise and obscures the contradictions between market-
oriented reform on the one hand, and improving the livelihoods of the poor while 
asserting ‘national ownership’ from without on the other (Ruiters, 2007: 488).  
 
Chapter Three elucidates the processes and relations which operationalise the PRS. 
First, the chapter foregrounds the role of labour, positing that the PRS pursues the 
proletarianisation of the African population as a programme to extend formalised 
production relations and attract foreign investment. This requires the commodification 
of land and the dispossession of the population. The depoliticised role of the state 
within the PRS facilitates the process of proletarianisation while restricting state 
capacity to directly promote projects that could provide employment for the 
subsequent workforce. Second, the chapter interprets the reconfiguration of the state 
to provide an institutional and socio-legal environment that is conducive to foreign 
investment. It further identifies this configuration of the state is unable to utilise the 
increased circulation of capital to promote the development of the national political 
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economy. The chapter concludes that the operationalisation of the PRS through 
policies concerning labour and the state have failed to generate the conditions for 
poverty reduction because they are premised on a model of endogenous capitalism. 
Indeed, the foundations of the PRS exacerbate and perpetuate the impediments to its 
objectives, because it fails to appreciate the structural disarticulations of capitalist 
development in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In order to understand the obstacles to economic growth, Chapter Four shifts to a 
focused examination of the political economies of the African periphery, explicating 
the historical conditions of Africa’s unique mode of ‘grafted’ capitalism. (Ndlela, 
2007: 88; Pellicani, 1994: 109). The chapter draws upon Samir Amin’s theory of 
‘disarticulation’ to identify the prevalent dislocations at play in Africa between 
production and consumption, formal and informal economic activity, productive and 
speculative capital, and agriculture and industry (Amin, 2011: 142; Wilkinson & 
Webster, 1982: 3; Shivji 2008: 14-16) The chapter concludes that the peripherisation, 
sectoral imbalances and demographic specificity which determine – and are 
determined by – the relations of production in sub-Saharan Africa are central to an 
understanding of capitalist development and poverty, and that their absence from the 
considerations of the PRS necessarily perpetuates Africa’s decoupled relationship 
with the global economy.  
 
The thesis concludes with an appraisal of the broader implications of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy for development in the African periphery. First, the PRS replaces 
the orthodox development agenda of “stabilise, liberalise, privatise,” with a subtler 
and seemingly more participatory strategy to pursue the same ends. This approach has 
failed to address the causes of African poverty because it does not reconcile the 
historically specific African conditions with a strategy of integration with global 
circuits of capital. However, the prevalence of the ‘inclusive neoliberal’ strategy 
should not be seen as a teleological effect of the contradictions inherent in globalised 
capitalism but as a manifestation of the contingency and dialectics which shape the 
World Bank’s development agenda (Mahon & Macdonald, 2009: 185). Second, the 
PRS disempowers the African poor, promoting their participation in the exigencies of 
a disarticulated market located on the periphery of a globalised structure of 
accumulation as ‘secure’ and ‘inclusive’. Simultaneously, it delegitimises their ability 
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to collectively gain more democratic representation in African governance. Ultimately 
the achievement of a genuine strategy of poverty reduction necessitates a domestic 
process to enhance state capacity in conjunction with higher and more equitable 
income distribution. This entails a reversal of the ‘intrusive’ mode of conditionality 
and development strategy. It also requires an appreciation of the role that contingent 
relationships within elite groups (particularly between the interests of state and 
capital) and relations between African elites and the broader polity play in 
reconstituting class relationships, forms of representation and the distribution of 
wealth. However, the widening consensus regarding the efficacy of neoliberal 
development policies currently poses an obstacle to domestic reform, perpetuating 
Africa’s endemic poverty and its peripheral position in the global political economy. 
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Chapter One: 
African Development and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
 
 
This chapter elucidates the development and design of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) and its precedents as the product of social contestation over the pursuit 
of ‘development’ in Africa. The purpose and meaning of ‘development’ has not had a 
clear definition since its inception (Rist, 2007: 486). Market-oriented structural 
adjustment had almost discredited the notion entirely in the 1980s, with the ‘post-
developmentalist’ school dismissing it as a “pernicious discourse” informed by uni-
linear modernisation theories (Tamas, 2007: 901; Ferguson, 2005: 166). The dialectic 
between progressive development theorists and World Bank orthodoxy precipitated 
the emergence of a revised policy framework which re-centred poverty reduction. The 
PRS has proved relatively successful in repositioning the World Bank as a pragmatic 
and neutral repository for ‘development knowledge’ and the promotion of a broader 
consensus around an ‘inclusive’ policy agenda within which market-led growth and 
integration with global accumulation circuits could be pursued in heavily-indebted 
African countries (World Bank, 1999: 140).  
 
This chapter argues that the World Bank is increasingly involved in a project to 
transform social relations and further integrate the African political economies into a 
globalised structure of capitalist accumulation. First, the chapter details the extent of 
development in Africa, emphasising the factors that underpin its status as the world’s 
‘poorest’ region and the potential opportunities suggested by some indictors. Second, 
the chapter analyses the key facets of the intense period of institutional and structural 
change that was precipitated by the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) 
implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Africa 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The third section analyses the emergence of 
the PRS in the context of contestation between states, capital, and “enlightened 
reactionaries” over the purpose of development and the control of debt-relief 
(Polanyi, 2001: 165). The revised agenda constitutes a rubric of governance and 
social relations in Africa that comprises a set of integrated ideas and specific 
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programmes for achieving poverty reduction through more participatory allocation of 
debt-relief towards social services and a macroeconomic structure designed to 
facilitate capitalist accumulation and formalised production and exchange. The 
chapter concludes that the emphasis placed upon social policy targetted at poverty 
reduction remains, in most instances, subsumed within a persistent market-oriented 
logic that aims to facilitate global accumulation circuits and economic activity 
capable of servicing the debt obligations of many African countries. 
 
 The State of Development in Africa 
 
At the start of the new Millennium, the prospects for African development seemed 
bleak. With few exceptions, economic indicators were discouraging, corruption, civil 
conflict or dictatorial states were prevalent, and infrastructure was dilapidated or non-
existent (Bertocchi & Canova, 2002: 1853; Moyo, 2010: 3). In the last decade, 
however, there have been signs of marginal improvement across the continent. Many 
African economies have achieved annual growth rates exceeding 5 percent 
consistently (OECD, 2014: 22). The majority hold some form of democratic elections 
and have improved in holistic indices such as the inequality adjusted Human 
Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2014: 2). There are three features that have 
facilitated the potential opportunities suggested by these indicators in the past fifteen 
years. First, the price of raw commodities such as oil, copper, coffee and rare minerals 
has risen, fuelling exports in African economies that have benefitted from foreign 
investment in ‘extraction’ infrastructure and a higher demand for luxury consumer 
goods from the burgeoning middle classes in other developing regions (OECD, 2014: 
34l; Broadman, 2007: 3-4). Second, and contrary to the “hopeless” label which 
accompanies Africa’s social indicators, there have been some noteworthy advances, 
with the rate of HIV falling across the region and rising primary education attainment 
(Economist, 2011; Barro & Lee, 2013: 43). Third, democratisation in sub-Saharan 
Africa has increased, with 600 million Africans expected to elect their own leaders in 
2014-15 (Mozaffar, 2002: 86; OECD, 2014: 18).  
 
Despite the important advances in political and socio-economic stability, the overall 
trend of poverty alleviation remains a troubling one. Sub-Saharan Africa has an 
average per capita income of little more than US$4 a day, making it the poorest 
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region in the world (World Bank, 2013). Real per capita income in sub-Saharan 
Africa (excluding South Africa and the Seychelles) was US$ 315 p.a. in 2001 which, 
when adjusted for inflation, was lower than it was in 1960 (Hanke, 2001; Ellis, 2012: 
209). Since the inception of the PRS in the late-1990s, the amount of people living 
below US$1.25 a day has increased from 349 million to 416 million, although the 
percentage of the population this represents has fallen to below half (Appendix One: 
Regional Poverty Trend, World Bank, 2014). Average per capita income in sub-
Saharan Africa between 1993 and 2008 barely moved from US$742 to US$ 762 
(Lakner & Milanovic, 2013: 1) Africa’s share of global trade in terms of value added 
grew almost imperceptivity from 1.4 percent in 1995 to 2.2 percent in 2011. The 
growth indicated by increases in gross national income (GNI) per capita has widened 
the inequality of income distribution, as the demographic in absolute poverty persists 
while export oriented macroeconomic strategies benefit local elites (Appendix Two: 
Distribution of GDP per Capita, IMF, 2014: 22). 
 
Persistently high poverty indicators suggest that Africa’s economic performance has 
“decoupled” from the development trajectory of the rest of the world (Kose et al, 
2012: 512). Given the historical origins of Africa’s extraverted political and economic 
relationship with international actors and the intrinsic role that the IMF and World 
Bank have played in the last thirty years of Africa’s development, a critical 
understanding of the origins of the contemporary Poverty Reduction Strategy is 
required. 
 
Addressing the ‘Crisis’: Structural Adjustment and a ‘Neoliberal Consensus’ 
 
The hegemonic position of the IMF and World Bank in administering the expansion 
of the global capitalist system in Africa is, in large part, due to their ability to 
monopolise development ‘knowledge’ and dispense ‘hard currency’ to impoverished 
governments on conditional circumstances (Hall, 1996: 27; Pieper & Taylor, 1998: 
39). Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, the disbursement of concessional finance 
became increasingly conditional on the implementation of prescribed Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAPs) (Easterley, 2005: 8). The policies prioritised currency de-
valuation, privatisation, deregulation, and trade liberalisation (herein referred to as 
‘reform’) and were codified in John Williamson’s (1990) Washington Consensus 
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(Appendix Three: The World Bank’s Policy Review, Ishikawa, 2002: 5).  
 
With conditional debt-relief from the IMF and World Bank, African governments 
adopted the new reform agenda readily: dismantling state marketing boards, reducing 
inflation, removing trade protections, and divesting and privatising more than half of 
the state-owned enterprises and industries in the region (Oyejide, 1997: 12; Nellis, 
2003: 113). The extent to which economies were integrated within global 
accumulation circuits was often seen as synonymous with ‘development’ which was 
entrenched in a causal logic of participation in the global market, facilitating growth 
and thereby increasing the prosperity of the participants  (Rist, 2002: 211). Such was 
the political impetus behind these reforms that Williamson (2000: 251) himself 
protested, particularly over the extent and rapidity with which financial liberalisation 
was pursued in the developing world. Nevertheless, the implementation of market 
reform as a conditionality of debt-relief and concessional finance was perceived by 
critics of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as an overtly ideological 
promotion of ‘market fundamentalism’ and a universal ‘neoliberal’ solution to the 
challenges faced by developing countries (Rodrik, 2006: 982).  
 
The predominance of a ‘neoliberal consensus’ in development policy cannot be 
understood solely in terms of the prevalence of fundamentalist neoliberal ideas such 
as privatisation, deregulation and marketisation in development discourse. It is also 
(and arguably primarily) a result of the changing social relations between capital and 
labour in a trans-nationalised structure of production and accumulation (Cahill, 2013: 
81; Harvey, 2005: 110). The increasingly ‘globalised’ composition of the capitalist 
system was presented by the IFIs as a remote and inexorable phenomenon which 
required heavily-indebted African countries to implement ‘pragmatic’ structural and 
sectoral adjustments to ‘participate’ and benefit from global markets  (World Bank, 
2001: 25; OECD, 2014: 18).  
 
The fragmentation of production structures precipitated by technological innovation 
since the 1970s has, in some accounts, determined the predominance of ‘neoliberal’ 
policy responses designed to utilise the mobility of capital and enhanced export 
networks as a means of enhancing Africa’s position in the international market (Kotz 
& McDonough, 2010: 93; Garrett, 2000: 941). It is evident that the World Bank and 
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IMF have been instrumental in designing and imposing a framework and context that 
facilitates and extends access to, and participation in, global accumulation circuits for 
African political economies (Gilpin, 2001: 331; Gill, 1995: 400). However, the IFIs 
are not driven solely by the imperative of capital to continually expand to new 
markets. As institutions, the World Bank and IMF are social structures, within which 
and through which social forces act upon the world (Rückert, 2007: 96). The 
predominance of neoliberal policies and strategies of global accumulation that are 
manifest in the SAP and PRS are actually the product of a historically conditioned 
moment of global capitalist social relations and are a contingent product of  
contestation between states, capital and social movements (Taylor, 2005: 154). 
 
The neoliberal structure of globalised accumulation is a non-hegemonic system, and 
has increasingly been maintained by the use of coercion to condition social relations 
and resolve social conflicts (Ferguson, 2006: 43; O’Brien, 2000: 218). This non-
hegemony manifested itself in sub-Saharan Africa in the resistance of African 
governments and social movements to the IFI’s strict conditionalities on debt-relief 
that were perceived to exacerbate worsening social and economic indicators 
(Prempeh, 2006: 93; O’Brien, 2000: 218). By the mid-1990s, structural adjustment 
had proved an ineffective or incomplete solution to Africa’s economic performance 
and debt crisis, with widespread poverty becoming an entrenched feature of the 
African economic landscape (Kingston et al, 2011: 114). The international 
contestation of the IFIs legitimacy in promoting development reform (most notably in 
‘IMF riots’) necessitated a transition to a revised strategy for delivering debt-relief 
and alleviating poverty in Africa (Sahn, 1994: 21). 
 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy: Embedding and Appropriation 
 
The PRS was evolved in 1999 as a revision of the debt-relief conditionality imposed 
through SAPs. The transition to the PRS was contingent on the political economic 
conditions of donor countries. The 1990s and early 2000s witnessed an ideological 
shift towards fiscal conservatism among Western donor governments who had 
championed direct budgetary support for developing countries earlier in the decade. 
In this political climate, the risk of ‘hands-free’ development financing was 
considered too high, as governments were increasingly held accountable for the use of 
 15 
domestic taxes for foreign benefit (Moore, 2004: 297). The resulting demand for more 
control of, and returns for, finance given to African governments necessitated a 
process which bound both donors and recipients to an agreed supply and use of aid 
and development strategy (Sumner, 2006: 1401).  
 
Debt-relief was re-designed to ensure that the financial aid channeled to impoverished 
governments was utilised for increased social spending targetted at alleviating 
poverty. Under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC2), 
countries were required to complete an ex ante conditionality of three years 
compliance with IFI-approved macroeconomic policy before reaching a ‘decision 
point’ as to whether it would be eligible for debt-relief. When this condition was met 
the country composed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) setting out a wide-
ranging summary of macroeconomic and social policies as well as an estimate of 
debt-relief required to fund a plan for social services over three years.  
 
Entry into the PRS framework and its concomitant financial assistance programme the 
HIPC2, is regulated by two disciplinary prerequisites. First, heavily indebted 
countries are required to implement a host of macroeconomic policies designed to 
promote ‘debt sustainability’ by improving access to commodity markets, reducing 
vulnerability to exogenous ‘shocks’ and adopting a system of conservative macro-
fiscal administration (Helleiner, 1992: 779; Easterley, 2002: 1677). Second, eligibility 
into the PRS requires a commitment to channel concessional finance and debt-
cancellation to support ‘pro-poor’ public sector investments in accordance with the 
provisos and targets of the World Bank (Easterley, 2002: 1678).  
 
The purpose of these ex-ante processes of conditionality is two-fold. It fosters a 
relationship of accountability with national governments that adheres them to the 
norms and boundaries of global capitalism’s macro-economic, governance and social 
policies (Collier, 2006: 1482; Gould, 2005: 31). It also allows the logic of ‘inclusion’ 
to permeate through the level of the nation-state to households where, under the rubric 
of ‘good governance’, individuals are ‘conditioned’ into a particular set of relations 
including formalised economic exchange, individualised land tenure, and the 
promotion of self-interest over communal or familial well-being (Porter & Craig, 
2004: 398).  
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The PRSP are designed to be nationally specific but there are three factors which 
overarch these variations. First, the PRSPs seek a continuation of structural reform in 
terms of deregulation, privatisation, and trade liberalisation, but demand a more 
coordinated and decentralised delivery of social services and public goods to facilitate 
these reforms (Pejovich, 2012: 164). Second, IFI debt-relief is granted to national 
governments in the form of budgetary assistance, designed to enhance the capacity of 
the state to ‘effectively’ manage its finance. Third, there is an emphasis on the 
national ownership of the PRS and the role that ‘participation’ with all members of 
society plays in democratising its delivery (Booth, 2005: 13). 
 
The notion of ‘country ownership’ became a central facet of the PRS for two 
interrelated reasons. On the one hand, the difficulty of enforcing reform on sovereign 
political actors, even heavily-indebted ones, demonstrated that the IFIs lacked the 
means to effectively enforce their development strategy unilaterally (Craig & Porter, 
2006: 23). On the other, there was a perceived need to emphasise the specificity and 
legitimacy of the PRS in a way which necessitated approval from national 
governments. Through national ownership, the PRS aimed to ‘re-territorialise’ 
development policy, emphasising a commitment to displacing universal solutions 
with more contextualised and nationally-owned approaches involving consultation 
with a broad range of stakeholders (Hickey, 2012: 684).  
 
Mainstream development literature posited that the failure of SAP reform to improve 
economic or social indicators in much of Africa was due in large part to the 
incomplete or unwilling application of the IFI’s reforms (Joyce, 2006: 1; Konadu-
Agyemang, 2000: 471). Programmatised structural adjustment had failed to embed 
itself in the African State as the founding logic of public action (Harrison, 2004: 4).  
As a result, World Bank discourse fixated on the importance of civil society in 
furthering poverty reduction (Williams, 2010: 406). Civil society was seen as a 
potentially transformative element of both weak African states and stagnant 
economies. A civil society that was included into the poverty reduction agenda would 
be more likely to demand increases in state responsiveness and the implementation of 
World Bank policies (Williams & Young, 1994: 85). It was in this context that the 
debt-relief relations and development policy of the IFIs were reframed as a 
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‘partnership’ premised on ‘participation’. Furthermore, Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) were to be included in the consultations that informed national 
PRSPs so that the voices of the poor could be better represented. Additionally, 
African governments were to work towards the objectives of the PRS not because of 
conditional finance but because of a “subtler dynamic of alleged mutual complicity” 
(Gould, 2005: 63).  
 
The transformation of social relations in sub-Saharan Africa required to facilitate the 
PRS necessarily required a more comprehensive policy agenda that encompassed all 
aspects of ‘governance’. Creating a consensus within civil society regarding the 
benefits of reform required a particular rubric of governance, comprising a set of 
integrated ideas and specific programmes that drew all communities into an 
‘inclusive’ and ‘participatory’ process of development (Grindle, 2011: 212; Addison 
et al, 2011: 463). With persistent or increasing poverty rates in Africa, the World 
Bank was compelled to concede that “state-dominated development has failed. But so 
has state-less development ... [h]istory has repeatedly shown that good government is 
not a luxury but a vital necessity” (World Bank, 1997: iii). The stated aim of ‘good 
government’ in the PRS was to develop and transform a “stronger government focus 
[on poverty] into an institutionalised commitment to poverty reduction” and “expand 
civil society consultations into deeper forms of government accountability to citizens” 
(Driscoll with Evans, 2005: 10). This entailed greater transparency and accountability 
for African governments as well as an emphasis on reducing corruption and 
enhancing decentralisation.  
 
In terms of operationalising the PRS, a convergence of policy and research from the 
World Bank identified pro-poor growth as the central component of achieving 
sustainable poverty reduction. Artificial barriers to entry or discrimination of gender 
or ethnicity in particular sectors, professions or the formal labour market in general, 
were identified as being most detrimental to the poor (Hickey & Mohan, 2008: 235). 
A pro-poor growth strategy entailed the removal of institutional and policy induced 
biases against the poor. In addition, policies were targeted at inclusion of the poor in 
formalised market exchange (Ravallion, 2004: 2). The constraints to pro-poor growth 
in sub-Saharan Africa were identified as a concentration of infrastructure in urban 
rather than rural areas, and the presence of monopolised industries that maintained 
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artificially high prices of services and commodities that were widely needed. Pro-poor 
policies were also to target the provision of a stable regime of social reproduction 
including basic services, healthcare and education (Kakwani & Pernia, 2000: 4).  
 
The PRS has been credited with some positive achievements in sub-Saharan Africa. 
For example, Ghana has received US$3.7 billion in debt relief out of its US$ 6 billion 
total debt, reducing the nations debt-repayments by $250 million annually. In 
Tanzania the budget for primary education was increased by 52% between 2000 and 
2003 which increased net enrolments from 57% to 85% (Cheru, 2001: 10). The debt-
relief has facilitated an almost ubiquitous increase in spending on social policy areas 
in sub-Saharan Africa (Driscoll & Evans, 2005: 11). However, the translation of these 
improvements into reductions of poverty (in terms of income) has been 
underwhelming. There is an apparent disconnect between macroeconomic reform, 
increased social spending and poverty reduction that lies beyond the approach of the 
PRS (Gore, 2000: 795; Sumner, 2006: 1402). The emphasis on more accountable 
forms of social spending and governance, through a combination of macroeconomic 
reform and participatory inclusion in the formulation of PRSPs, has demonstrated in 
the past fifteen years that it is an incomplete solution to the impediments to growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Booth, 2005: 3).  
 
The transition from structural adjustment to PRS represents a dialectical tension 
between the interests of private capital within the international capitalist system and 
an appreciation that these interests are often opposed to the reduction of poverty. The 
economic liberalisation enforced through SAPs attempted to transform localised and 
traditional social formations in Africa to facilitate commodification and the 
‘unfettered’ use of the market in distributing capital and labour efficiently (Porter & 
Craig, 2004: 390). The increased depravation and detrimental consequences of 
commodified social regulation engendered a concerted effort in the mid-1990s to 
mitigate the social disruptions of market-led liberalisation by prioritising the delivery 
of social services to reduce poverty and alleviating the detrimental impact that 
participation in internationally competitive markets can have on the poor. The PRS 
has been shaped by this dialectic, with competing material interests and social 
imperatives informing how the strategy is manifest in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
progressive theories that informed the formation of the poverty reduction agenda 
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include the welfare economics of Amartya Sen (1995), the pro-poor emphasis of 
Martin Ravallion (2004), and the revised consideration of state capacity and 
globalisation extolled by Joseph Stiglitz (2002; 2003: 3). However, the attempts to 
mitigate the social disruptions of market reform by these “enlightened reactionaries” 
have been contested and appropriated in the PRS approach (Polanyi, 2001: 165). 
Rather than providing a basis for mitigating the social disruptions and exigencies of 
globalised accumulation circuits, the ‘comprehensive’ social policy that ‘progressive 
theorists advocate has been transformed into a broader liberal vernacular of poverty 
reduction that encompasses a set of de-politicised rationalities and participatory 
notions such as inclusion, empowerment, and security (Porter & Craig, 2004: 392).  
 
Conclusion: Continuity and Legitimacy  
 
The PRS marks a significant development in the way that debt relief and development 
strategies are managed between the World Bank and African governments. Informed 
by the failures of the SAPs in Africa, the PRS emphasises a partnership designed to 
foster state capacity and ensure that debt-relief is channeled into social policy 
designed to alleviate poverty. The PRS is also premised on the inclusion of Non-
Government Organisations to represent the needs of the poor in drafting national 
budgets and policies. However, the ‘reform triumvirate’ of privatisation, liberalisation 
and deregulation remains a pervasive factor of World Bank policy and this continuity 
engenders a reproduction of past failings. Despite the introduction of national 
ownership and inclusive participation, poverty reduction is still embedded in a 
strategy to restructure social relations in Africa to facilitate international capital flows 
and provide a stable and dynamic macro-economy.  
 
The popular discourse of poverty reduction conceals the actual extent of inclusion, 
empowerment and security experienced by heavily-indebted African countries and 
their poorest citizens. The broader consensus between government officials, IFI 
functionaries and academics that now endorse PRSPs as a comprehensive approach to 
poverty reduction are co-opted into an increasingly restricted debate about what 
constitutes ‘effective’ poverty reduction policy.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Ideological Mechanisms of the Poverty Reduction Strategy: 
Inclusion, Empowerment and Security 
 
The previous chapter described the emergence of the World Bank’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRS) as a reaction to the failures of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs). It elucidated the revised nature of conditionality and 
development strategy and identified that the PRS had been largely ineffective in 
reducing poverty in sub-Saharan Africa from 2000. This chapter deepens the 
investigation into the PRS by foregrounding its three rhetorical ‘pillars’: inclusion, 
empowerment and security (World Bank, 2000/1: 12). It identifies the logic that 
underpins these amorphous terms and their interrelation in re-structuring political 
economies in Africa. Re-interpreting the PRS in this way demonstrates that it is 
premised on establishing consensus and mollifying resistance to an underlying 
strategy of development. This strategy necessitates expanding global circuits of 
capitalist accumulation throughout sub-Saharan Africa by embedding the social and 
material relations of capitalism. Including, empowering and securing the livelihoods 
of the poor in a broader framework which exposes the same population to the 
exigencies of an internationally competitive labour market is inherently contradictory. 
This logic has precipitated a strategy that seeks to legitimise neoliberal capitalism as a 
means of poverty reduction, disaggregate representative institutions and provide 
security through an intrusive and disciplinary regime of social reproduction for the 
poorest citizens.  
 
The accord between ‘market and community interests’ that the PRS embodies must be 
problematised as it is a notion with wide appeal among bureaucrats, Non-Government 
Organisation (NGO) activists and social movements in the developing and developed 
world. There is a necessity to strip “adjustment policies of their poverty reduction 
clothing” (Hellinger et al, 2001: 1). The convergence in African Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) around the concepts of inclusion, empowerment and security 
does not demonstrate a shift in the global political economy towards enfranchising 
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those at the periphery of the global capitalist system or the emergence of pro-poor 
social governance (Wallerstein, 1974; 389; Gaventa, 2004: 39). Rather it 
demonstrates that these principles are part of an all-encompassing parlance which 
claims to represent a development strategy which prioritises the needs of the poor. In 
actuality it describes a limited agenda, disseminated from a ‘market fundamentalist’ 
convergence of reform, supplemented by policies designed to foster legitimacy 
through ‘partnership’ and deliver social services to mitigate the exigencies of an 
internationally competitive labour market (Rückert, 2006: 38). 
 
Inclusion: Consent and Coercion in International Capitalism 
 
The primary inclusion of the PRS is the participation of national governments and 
NGOs in the formulation of a national PRSP designed to democratise and legitimise 
the reforms and policies expected of African countries in return for debt-relief. In the 
majority of cases the ‘participatory’ process is reduced to a consultation meeting 
between World Bank and IMF staff, with a select group of government officials and 
NGO representatives. Input from national representatives and NGOs is subject to 
ultimate approval by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Although this 
process enhances the ability of national governments to shape the PRS, it falls short of 
genuine democratic involvement and is never extensively debated in African 
parliaments, with the vast majority of political parties agreeing on the necessity of the 
PRS as a means of securing debt relief.  
 
The inclusion of NGOs to represent the needs of the poor and civil society is a further 
shortfall of genuine representation, with the majority of NGOs being “urban-based, 
middle class led, single oriented and donor supported” (Nyong’o: 2002: 48). The 
selection of NGOs is managed by the central government and the result is the 
exclusion of more radical organisations, such as student or labour unions and 
professional associations (Seshamani, 2002: 8). The constrained process of 
participation in the provision of the PRS nevertheless imbues the strategy with a sense 
of national consensus. The consensus is predicated on the notion that the imperatives 
capital accumulation can be aligned with the social imperative of alleviating poverty, 
and that this logic should inform economic and social governance in Africa to provide 
better opportunities for the poor and a more responsive, efficient state (Porter & 
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Craig, 2004: 389; Stewart & Wang, 2004: 290). ‘Inclusion’ and ‘participation’ in the 
consultation process are an advanced form of governmentality designed to instil the 
norms of the global political economy in the development strategy for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Higgins & Lockie (2002: 421) identify the role of partnership and 
participation as a “technology of agency” rather than control, in which the acceptable 
parameters and processes of poverty reduction as conceived by the World Bank are 
internalised by the ‘included’ national governments and then translated to households 
through national policies (Salter, 2006: 167; Mahon & Macdonald, 2009: 184). 
 
The ‘inclusive’ framework of poverty reduction is significantly problematic in that it 
establishes a popular consensus around the efficacy of ‘market fundamentalism’ in 
reducing poverty. The parlance of ‘poverty reduction’ is widely popular and adaptable 
and thus is often adopted as the central focus of governance and social policy. 
However, the inclusion of national governments and non-state actors in the process of 
formulating development policy has not broadened the scope of civil or political 
debate regarding poverty reduction, but rather co-opted a far larger proportion of 
bureaucrats, NGOs and social movements into supporting the World Bank’s 
demarcated reform agenda. The focus on democratic forms of governance has been 
further undermined as the PRS has empowered a technocratic “iron-triangle” of 
donors, technocrats and professionalised NGOs in Africa, bypassing the more 
political vociferous actors such as unions, the free media, social movements and the 
backbenches of parliament (Gould, 2005: 5-7; Hickey & Mohan, 2008: 234). Thus, 
including national governments and NGOs in the formulation of PRSPs does not 
enhance state capacity or foster democratic discourse regarding a nationally-owned 
strategy. Instead it is a process by which a limited selection of key actors are aligned 
with the World Bank’s prescriptions of effective poverty reduction policy. 
 
The World Bank has placed itself in a unique position as the sole repository for global 
development knowledge (World Bank, 1999: 140). The monopoly of the World Bank 
on data collection, policy design and implementation facilitates a cycle of 
development strategies that is relatively impervious to contrary evidence or 
conflicting approaches. The Bank identifies its role as “accumulating the right kind of 
knowledge, and helping [its] clients build the capacity to use it” (Wolfensohn, 1996: 
29, emphasis added). In statements like this, it is axiomatic that the World Bank has 
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the monopoly on the ‘right’ kind of development knowledge and the correct means or 
‘capacity’ to deliver appropriate reform (Cammack, 2007: 196). The emphasis on 
‘capacity’ highlights the tensions and contradictions inherent in the policies which the 
Bank seeks to implement, which must be incorporated into a nationally-owned and 
inclusive strategy or be construed as intrusive, detrimental or unpopular. The 
‘inclusive’ framework serves to legitimise the need to enforce reform both through 
(financial) coercion and (political) consent. The PRS is a universal blueprint for a 
complete reconfiguration of social and governmental relations and institutions in 
Africa, premised on macro and micro technologies designed to discipline nation-states 
and individuals (Rückert, 2006: 34). The extent of the ‘inclusive’ framework 
subsumes the principles of sovereignty and democratic representation in Africa within 
a broader conjuncture of global accumulation and a false sense of ‘ownership’ 
through mechanisms of participation and consultation.  
 
A further quality of the ‘inclusive’ policies in the PRS, is the use of education to align 
civil and political discourse in sub-Saharan countries with the norms and principles of 
the World Bank. This is particularly apparent in the view of education in World Bank 
discourse as the enhancement of ‘social capital’ to advance an individuals 
involvement in an internationally competitive labour market. The role of education in 
expanding the proportion of African’s with the skills to engage in the formal labour 
market is evident in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebook (PRSS) which serves 
as the basis for acceptable development policy. It asserts that   
 
 “broad-based education is associated with faster diffusion of information 
within the economy, which is crucial for enabling workers and citizens in both the 
traditional and modern sectors to increase productivity. These impacts are strongest 
where education is integrated into a broader competitiveness strategy that includes 
macroeconomic stability, trade openness, incentives for foreign investment, 
competitive telecommunications pricing and adequate infrastructure investments 
(World Bank, 2002: 112). 
 
The reduction of the role of primary and secondary education to serve the labour 
market represents an increasingly pervasive commodification of ‘knowledge’ in 
development practice. The World Bank framework appropriates Amartya Sen’s 
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(1990) Development as Capability Expansion and re-casts capabilities as 
commoditised ‘social capital’ enhancing ones ability to pursue individual financial 
gain. In this way, the progressive notion that education can provide greater freedom 
and capabilities for the poor is appropriated within the PRS as the enhancement of 
‘social capital’ to enhance their ability to participate in a competitive labour market of 
a broader macroeconomic framework. The discrepancy between the ‘ability’ to pursue 
greater personal affluence within the labour market and the personal ‘freedom’ of 
capabilities is one which is not addressed nor fully recognised in the Bank’s discourse 
(World Bank, 2013: 214).   The social policy of the PRS framework is included into 
the broader institutional goal of attracting private investment and ensuring the 
reproduction and skills of the African poor through education, healthcare and family 
planning assistance (Kothari & Minogue, 2002: 166-167). 
 
Empowerment: National Strategies and Indebted Subservience  
 
The parlance of inclusion is complemented in the PRS by the notion of 
empowerment. Empowerment acts specifically to reframe the way in which the PRS 
is owned and implemented by national governments. The notion of ‘ownership’ in the 
PRS is instrumental in tying African states to the market-oriented reform and social 
spending of the World Bank.  
 
Despite the cooperation of national officials with IFI staff in the formulation of a 
PRSP, the scope and extent of acceptable reform is strictly limited by the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Sourcebooks, which are the blueprint for the extent of 
development policy which will be approved in exchange for debt-relief (Klugman, 
2002a; Klugman, 2002b). Commenting on the Zambian PRSP, Seshamani (2002: 9) 
notes that stabilisation remains the primary objective of the strategy and that there has 
been no alteration of the macro-economic reforms supported during the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) era. As such, the extent to which states are empowered 
by national strategies is severely restricted by the mandate that underpins PRSP debt-
relief conditionality. According to Cammack (2003: 48), the failures of the World 
Bank’s development policy in sub-Saharan Africa have their roots in the uniformity 
of the PRS, which applies the same set of market facilitating policies regardless of the 
empirical specificity of the country in which it is enacted. The tension inherent in this 
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process generates the fundamental contradiction that is most widely remarked upon – 
the simultaneous need for the policies which are adopted in Africa to fit within the 
strategic framework set out by the Bank, and to be ‘freely’ chosen and ‘owned’ by 
African governments (Buiter, 2007: 647). It is this categorical imperative that makes 
the notion of ‘country ownership’ a “sham” and provides the basis for continuation of 
universalist development prescriptions from the World Bank (Pender 2001: 409).  
 
The PRS is premised on the institutionalisation of micro-level incentives that shape 
social relations in ways that are conducive to furthering capitalist accumulation 
(Rückert, 2006: 50). National governments in Africa must therefore be empowered to 
act as a conduit for translating World Bank policies into effective outcomes in 
society. The process of empowerment is tied to the notion of state capacity and a need 
for a decentralised structure of governance. The disaggregation of collective forms of 
representation is described as “making the state more responsive to people’s needs, 
bringing government closer to the people through broader participation and 
decentralisation” (World Bank, 1997: 3). Decentralisation provides a mechanism by 
which individuals and their communities are incorporated into an atomised 
relationship with the state and the international labour market. Within the PRS 
decentralisation is designed to expand state capacities and subordinate local 
authorities into a disaggregated regime of service delivery, rather than providing 
enhanced local representation (Sheppard & Leitner, 2010: 187). This process is 
framed as a partnership between central and local government, but is designed to 
integrate provinces or regions (which are often ethnically or tribally diverse) into a 
constitution of spatial and social relations which empowers the central government’s 
ability to monitor and enforce the strategy of the PRSP. The decentralisation of 
governance also serves to ‘localise’ and disaggregate the ‘accountability’ for poverty 
toward regional or community actors, rather than central governments or the PRS 
itself (Ndedi, 2003: 2). With the central government implementing a liberal socio-
legal framework, poverty is conceived of as a failure of local governments or private 
enterprises to distribute resources effectively. In World Bank discourse, poverty is 
considered to be a lack of social capital, and so the inability of individuals to 
participate in the market is seen as a local failure of primary education and healthcare, 
rather than a broader national or strategic failure to generate employment or address 
regional disparities (World Bank, 1990: 4).  
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In the impoverished, conflictual and disconnected institutional environment of many 
sub-Saharan countries, decentralising the management and administration of the 
impoverished communities is confronted by the unstable, inhibited and under-
resourced nature of local government. A web of local councils and NGOs delivering 
fragmented basic services to isolated enclaves of clients is the true extent of the 
‘empowered’ decentralisation of government that is envisaged in the rhetoric of many 
PRSPs (Bakker & Gill, 2006: 36). The penetration of these ideas into African social 
movements is demonstrated by a publication from a Tanzanian Civil Society 
Organisation (CSO) ‘Hakikazi Catalyst’ designed to explain the principles of the PRS 
in simpler terms. Within it, a cartoon succinctly demonstrates the subordination of 
‘local participation’ to national strategy, illustrating the limitations and biases of 
decentralised governance as perceived by Tanzanian commentators (Appendix Four: 
Tanzanian CSO Illustration of Decentralisation, cited in Cammack, 2007: 208).  
 
A further example of the limited extent of decentralisation is provided by the 
Ugandan PRSP which outlines an increased capacity for local actors, designed to 
allow local councils to allocate funds for social policies, while also articulating the 
national strategy (Government of Uganda & IMF, 2010: 4). In practice 
decentralisation policies such as the Local Government Act in Uganda served to 
reinforce the dominance of ministry-led sectoral approaches rather than precipitate 
greater inclusion and efficiency in democratic processes and distribution (Lister & 
Nyamugasira, 2003: 103). Local authorities were unable to raise revenue 
independently and thus relied on compliance with the mandates of the central 
government to receive financing (Ellis & Bahigwa, 2003: 1010). Thus the 
empowering process of democratic inclusion and decentralisation instead represents 
an attempt to restructure the relations between regions, facilitating greater monitoring 
and compliance with the strategy agreed to by the IFIs and national governments 
(Ellis & Freeman, 2004: 18). The PRS locates the imperatives of empowerment and 
security for the poor in a framework of governance, which disaggregates collective or 
communal representation, replacing it with an atomised relationship between 
individuals within a market, in which each is empowered to act as any other citizen. 
This has salient consequences for marginalised communities, whose ‘security’ is 
provided through a commodified social reproduction regime in which conditionality 
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is transferred from the nation-state to the household, disciplining the poor rather than 
empowering them. 
 
Security: Stability and Social Reproduction 
 
Social inclusivity and national empowerment are managed as part of a wider poverty 
reduction imperative of security. Whereas in SAPs security was largely synonymous 
with macroeconomic stability, the PRS aims to provide security for those citizens 
unable to pay for privatised basic services through the direct provision of conditional 
subsidies. Inadequate social protection for impoverished citizens is identified in the 
PRS as a primary cause of intergenerational poverty.  
  
The PRS paradigm re-frames the previous market-oriented social reproduction regime 
within a broader decentralised and ‘inclusive’ socio-legal structure which provides 
underlying financial support for the social reproduction of the most marginalised and 
vulnerable demographic (Schubert & Slater, 2006: 571). This regime of social 
reproduction entails an unprecedented monitoring and intrusion into the livelihoods of 
the poor.  This programme of surveillance is facilitated by the technical innovation of 
Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), which are a collaboration between the 
World Bank, national and local officials to better monitor and administer 
impoverished citizens in Africa (World Bank, 1992a: 4).  
 
Social reproduction is commonly confined to the processes involved in reproducing 
humans and their labour power on both a daily and inter-generational basis, through 
the acquisition and distribution of the means of existence including food, clothing, 
shelter, education and medical care (Katz, 2001: 710). However, Ruth Pearson (1998: 
241) asserts that social reproduction also refers to the process by which the whole of 
social relations necessary for the reproduction of a stable capitalist society is 
perpetuated. This expands the traditional definition beyond that of material 
provisioning to encompass elements such as the creation and dissemination of norms, 
values, and knowledge (Elson, 1998: 189-190). In addition to securing the means of 
existence, the reproduction of the labour force also necessitates a range of cultural 
forms and practices associated with knowledge, social justice and its apparatus and 
the media. As such, the World Bank aims to supports those who are marginalised by 
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the commodification of the means of subsistence through material and participatory 
concessions designed to foster a sense of inclusion, empowerment and security in the 
PRS.   
 
The majority of theoretical accounts regarding social reproduction accentuate the 
function of the state in providing material and ideational support. However, heavily-
indebted countries are impeded by a disjuncture between the material needs of their 
citizens and the regime of social reproduction that they are able to provide (Weiss, 
2004: 10). The privatisation and trade liberalisation policies that detrimentally impact 
the livelihoods of the poor are counterbalanced in the PRS by debt-relief which allows 
African governments to subsidise the process of social reproduction, directing 
spending towards infrastructure, basic healthcare and primary education designed to 
allow impoverished African citizens to enter the labour market.  The PRS provides a 
structure of  “material incentives to subaltern social forces to coopt [them] into a 
hegemonic world view” that is aligned with the principles of the PRS (Rückert, 2007: 
96).  
 
The ascendance of a new regime of social reproduction in Africa is based on the 
failures of both state-led social assistance programmes which were often poorly 
targeted, carrying high administrative costs, and the detrimental effect that privatised 
basic services have had on the poor (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005: 33). The role of social 
protection in the PRS is to provide the poor with the “social capital” to facilitate their 
participation in “internationally competitive” labour markets (Republic of Kenya & 
IMF, 2010: 31, 13; Kakwani et al, 2005: 12). This form of social protection engenders 
the transformation of social relations and the disciplining of poor communities into 
actions that promote their inclusion and participation in the labour market. 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are in their infancy in Africa, but represent a 
means of conditioning impoverished and marginalised communities through direct 
subsidies, orchestrated by the national government. Ethiopia currently has the largest 
CCT scheme which administers 7 million people through the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP) (Barrientos et al, 2009: 17).   
 
CCTs provide impoverished African citizens with access to social services in 
accordance with a number of stringent conditions (Das et al, 2005: 58). If individual 
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recipients do not comply with their “co-responsibilities” in a CCT contract, a 
household can lose this income and become reliant on family networks for survival. 
For example, in Nahouri, a rural province of Burkina Faso, mothers receive payments 
for their children’s food, education and health care with co-responsibilities including 
their children’s school attendance, regular visits to health clinics, attending 
educational sessions on health, nutrition, hygiene, domestic violence and family 
planning, and contributing to the upkeep of the community by participating in local 
projects (de Walque et al, 2010: 1; Lagarde et al, 2009: 14). Given the 
‘intergenerational focus of these schemes, the World Bank specifically identifies that 
mother’s control of financing has a stronger positive impact on a child’s health and 
schooling. This maternal focus of social reproduction has the potential to reinforce 
traditional gender roles within impoverished African communities, with no clear 
strategy for women’s empowerment (Molyneaux, 2006: 435).  
 
CCT’s are part of a broader reconstitution of African social reproduction under the 
PRS that does not envisage social protection from the market, but rather interprets the 
main objective of social policy to increase the human capital of the poor to facilitate 
their integration into market structures (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003: 83). In this 
context, factors such as social exclusion and extreme deprivation are assumed to be 
linked to the inability of the poor to effectively participate in the labour market 
(Bebbington, 1999: 2021). In the reconstitution of social reproduction in Africa, 
security in the form of welfare is considered not as a right – as in the case of social 
citizenship – but rather as a necessary pre-requisite for facilitating the successful 
economic participation of the poor in the labour market, provided in accordance with 
“responsible” individual behaviour. The disciplinary and conditional regulation of the 
poor as a means of ensuring their ‘securit’y has led some scholars to re-title the 
inclusive poverty reduction paradigm as “intrusive neoliberalism” (Mahon & 
Macdonald, 2009: 195).  
 
Conditionality has traditionally been imposed upon subsidies to national 
governments. Under the PRS regime of social reproduction CCTs are used to 
‘download’ conditionality through the state to determine the behaviour of poor 
communities and households. The poor are regulated and embedded in the relations 
and disciplines considered conducive to enhancing their ‘human capital’, in return for 
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material incentives designed to enhance their ability to escape poverty and participate 
in the marketised regime of social reproduction. The combination of privatised basic 
services and subsidies to the poor represents a new social reproduction regime that 
Anne Rückert identifies as “conditional inclusion” (Rückert, 2010: 834). 
 
Conclusion: Rhetoric and Reinforcing Past Failures 
 
The rhetorical pillars of the PRS are a vehicle through which the World Bank and 
IMF seeks to mediate, legitimise and conceal the true objectives of the PRSP. The 
poverty reduction vernacular of inclusion, empowerment and security has been 
appropriated to widen consensus regarding the efficacy of neoliberal governance and 
‘market fundamentalism’ in providing poverty reduction. Resistance to uniform, top-
down prescriptions of development strategy have been reframed as participatory and 
inclusive processes, which are tailored specifically to the recipient country and are 
nationally owned and determined. However, these notions of partnership and agency 
are constrained by the superficial nature of consultation and the conditional limits that 
are placed on acceptable reform by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebooks.  
Further the PRS attempts to provide security for those who are marginalised by the 
commoditisation of basic services with an intrusive means of disciplining the poor 
through subsidies aimed at facilitating their entry into the labour market.  
 
The PRS therefore reinforces, rather than disrupts, the failures of structural 
adjustment to address poverty in Africa. Ultimately, the strategy is not one designed 
specifically to address the unstable and impoverished livelihoods of many Africans. 
Instead the PRS legitimises and facilitates the expansion of capital accumulation into 
all areas of African political economies, by disciplining and transforming the 
governance and social reproduction structures to implement a far deeper 
conditionality and discipline aligned with the World Bank’s prescriptions. As the next 
chapter suggests, the institutionalisation of the PRS exposes the poor to the exigencies 
of international competition and the precarious position of being dispossessed in a 
peripheral labour market. Similarly, the reconstitution of the state exposes the poor 
more readily to the vicissitudes of financial capital, as a means of integrating Africa 
more completely into the globalised social structure of accumulation (Heintz, 2010: 
266). 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Institutional Mechanisms of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy: Labour & the State 
 
The previous chapter argued that the rhetoric of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) obfuscates the extent to which its policies are designed to transform 
social relations in Africa and embed disciplines in both governments and citizens that 
facilitate the integration of African political economies with global circuits of 
accumulation.  As such, the PRS should be referenced as a project for the regulation 
and institutionalisation of capitalist production and accumulation in sub-Saharan 
Africa, which has arisen from the recognition that a global capitalist system generates 
contradictions that cannot be addressed at the national level, even by the strongest 
states. This chapter elucidates the central contradiction of institutionalising the PRS: 
that poverty reduction is considered a by-product of growth throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa. It argues that there are two principal pre-requisites for capital accumulation. 
First, land must be commodified through the imposition of individualised land tenure. 
Second, the commodification and proletarianisation of labour must be extended to a 
larger proportion of the population, whose reliance on formalised wage-labour 
necessarily expands the labour market. These pre-requisites form the basis of the 
strategy to operationalise poverty reduction through greater capital accumulation.  
 
However, there are two additional conditions that the PRS pursues to sustain 
capitalism in sub-Saharan Africa. First, foreign financial and productive capital is 
required to facilitate the expanded production and accumulation necessary to employ 
the dispossessed workforce. Second, the role of the state is reconfigured to provide an 
institutional and socio-legal environment that is conducive to foreign investment. 
However, this configuration of the state is also unable to utilise the increased 
circulation of capital to promote the development of the national political economy, 
presenting a significant contradiction between the PRS’ emphasis on attracting 
foreign capital and the achievement of poverty reduction. 
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Operationalising the PRS: Commodifying Land and Labour 
 
The commodification of land and labour is the fulcrum of the World Bank’s 
operationalisation of poverty reduction. The combination of these processes facilitates 
the expansion of the labour supply in Africa which must be made internationally 
competitive and capable of enticing foreign investment and enterprise with its 
flexibility and low wages (Klugman, 2002a: 283; Asiedu, 2002: 107).  The prevalence 
of informal, non-commodified sectors, that are impervious to capital accumulation are 
centred as the key impediment to more extensive production and accumulation as a 
means of poverty reduction. The role of labour in the Poverty Reduction Strategy was 
first outlined in the 1990 World Development Report entitled Poverty. It opens with 
the seminal statement that Africa’s endemic poverty levels can be primarily overcome 
by “promot[ing] the productive use of the poor’s most abundant asset – labour” 
(World Bank, 1990: 3). The role of the labour market in the PRS is to facilitate the 
efficient movement of the existing African proletariat to the needs of capital and 
include the dispossessed reserve army of labour or ‘latent proletariat’ into productive 
activities (Cammack, 2003: 7). African men and women that subsist in ‘culturally 
perceived poverty’ between rural-small holdings and informal labour must be 
dispossessed of the means of subsistence to facilitate their entry into the ‘latent 
proletariat’ (Shiva, 1988: 10). 
 
The reforms of the PRS facilitate capital accumulation by commodifying land - 
extending dispossession through individualised land tenure - and commodifying 
labour by separating the poor from the means of subsistence and providing those who 
occupy the informal sector with skills, education and health (‘human capital’). The 
process of poverty reduction requires the extension of formal wage labour to 
incorporate the demographic currently existing on the spectrum of communal, 
informal and migratory economic activity, integrating them into an internationally 
competitive labour market. The commodification of African land and labour is 
presented as an emancipation for the impoverished who can “participate fully in the 
opportunities … unleashed by growth promoting reform” (Ravallion, 2004: 20). 
However, the dynamic self-expansion of capital, which underpins growth, is an 
uneven process which requires that a critical mass of the population should have no 
other means of survival than to offer themselves for work at a market-wage (Marx, 
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1976: 501). The ‘opportunities’ of growth-promoting reform arise out of the 
dispossession of the African population from the land as a means of subsistence. 
Recent efforts to secure land tenure across sub-Saharan Africa, in line with the 11th 
Millennium Development Goal for improving the lives of “slum dwellers” and the 
“rural poor”, have become a subverted means of dispossession and have created a 
precarious living situation for many poor urban and rural citizens (World Bank, 2013: 
137; Obeng-Odoom, 2012: 162). The process extends private property rights to 
communal land tenure and temporary urban dwellings, alienating a proportion of the 
population from their means of subsistence and reducing their access to credit (Elahi 
& Stilwell, 2013: 28). Formal land rights, determined by central and regional 
government have marginalised the poorest families and households who have 
insufficient social networks, capital or access to credit to compete for land tenure 
against larger capital interests in the agricultural sector or rapidly expanding cities 
(Cotula, 2009: 16; Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010). Without direct access to arable land, 
poor rural or migratory citizens must sell their labour in order to survive.  
 
However, the abundance of labour that dispossession creates is not utilised in the 
majority of sub-Saharan political economies. The prevalence of an informal sector 
serves as a physical manifestation of the disconnection between policies of 
dispossession and the emergence of an urbanised or semi-rural manufacturing 
industry that can capitalise on the labour of proletarianised Africans. There are two 
key contextual factors that have precipitated the under-development of industry in 
sub-Saharan Africa: failed Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies and the 
export-oriented strategy of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 
1980s. The ISI developmental policies that were in vogue in the immediate post-
independence period
3
 were dependent on imports for raw materials, machinery and 
intermediate inputs which greatly diminished the profitability of African firms (Kilby 
& Kilby, 1969; Anyang’ Nyong’o, 1988). This dependency created a lop-sided 
industrialisation (Seidman, 1974: 601) with a focus on consumer and intermediate 
goods aimed at the elite or limited urban market rather than processing basic 
commodities or producing capital goods. Within these policies there was also an 
emphasis on capitally-intense production over labour intensive techniques which 
                                                        
3
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generated little value-adding employment (Seidman, 1974: 604-611). This form of 
“dependency industrialisation” prohibited sustained growth and prevented the 
creation of an economic system “that display[ed] a reasonable symmetry between the 
structure of production and the structure of consumption” (Rweyemamu 1980: 2). The 
narrow base of production in sub-Saharan Africa was also exacerbated by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) promotion of export orientation and trade 
liberalisation designed to allow domestic manufacturers to focus on production with 
higher marginal returns. The necessity of importing capital goods, volatility of the 
political environment and relatively low-skilled labour force presented barriers to the 
development of a strong manufacturing sector, with trade liberalisation facilitating the 
importation of consumer goods at lower prices then domestic goods. 
 
 The PRS’s continued emphasis of export oriented growth strategies means that the 
dispossessed population are confronted by the restricted extent of the industrial sector 
(Collier & Venables, 2007: 1326). As a result there is a proliferation of cheap labour 
for industries that produce basic commodities with minimal value chains such as 
plantation agriculture and natural resource extraction (e.g. oil fields in Ghana, cotton 
plantations in Benin and Burkina Faso). Because of the limited forward and backward 
linkages between these industries and the rest of the economy, the African worker is 
not released into labour markets but instead relies upon informal trading, craft, 
quarrying and scrapping for precious metals (Wilkinson & Webster, 1982: 2; Obeng-
Odoom, 2012: 161-163). World Bank literature represents this “diversification of 
incomes” as up-skilling of the rural and urban poor who occupy the informal sector 
(World Bank 2014: 120; Bryceson, 1999: 173). However, these activities represent 
the super-exploitation of labour as capital is not required to pay the full cost of 
reproduction of labour power to the employed because informal exchange across 
multiple occupations is able to meet the increasingly restricted consumption needs of 
the workforce and the wider population (Jenkins, 1984: 30). In this context the 
informal sector is a form of subsidy to capital and provides a meagre and precarious 
income to a significant percentage of the sub-Saharan population. The informal 
economy provides an expansive reserve army of labour which keeps wages at the 
level of subsistence. The phenomenon of labour subsidising capital, as opposed to the 
capitalist logic of labour-power exchanging at the value underlying expanded 
reproduction, is at the centre of the systemic devaluation of labour and resources in 
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sub-Saharan Africa. This devaluation and exploitation forms the basis of Africa’s 
peripheral position within global capitalism and the transfer of surplus from African 
political economies to the ‘developed’ core (Tiffen, 2003: 1343). The proliferation of 
the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates the inability of export-
oriented growth strategies to provide sufficient complementarities in the economy to 
sustainably employ the labour that formalised land tenure releases into the market.  
 
One of the additional pre-requisites to sustaining capital accumulation in sub-Saharan 
Africa is attracting investment from foreign financial capital. For this investment to be 
beneficial, it is required in sectors of the economy that facilitate the realisation of 
surplus value in domestic or regional markets, creating forward and backward 
linkages that engage a larger percentage of the population in production and value-
adding employment. The reliance of the poverty reduction strategy on the free flow of 
foreign financial capital to export-oriented industries prioritises the exportation of 
basic commodities which - due to the extensive reserve army of labour provided by 
the informal economy driving wages down – results in detrimental terms of trade for 
African political economies (Galbraith, 2008: 76; Bradshaw & Tshandu, 1990: 230). 
The desired model of labour-intensive growth and ‘participation’ within the PRS is 
incomplete, and overly reliant on foreign capital to provide employment outside of 
plantation agriculture and natural resource extraction.  
 
A further contradiction of the desired model of labour intensive growth is the role that 
trade unions are assigned in the IFIs development paradigm (Klugman, 2002a: 250). 
In the 1995 report, Workers in an Integrating World, the World Bank set out an 
agenda to remove ‘protectionist’ and infrastructural barriers to the exploitation of 
labour and to integrate African workers into the internationally competitive labour 
market as a means of poverty reduction. The report goes on to promote “effective” 
unions, which play the dual (and contradictory) role of removing the need for 
extensive state regulation - which is counter to the extraction of surplus value – and 
doing little to oppose reform programmes by protecting their members jobs or 
distorting the market (World Bank, 1995: 74). The ‘inclusive’ rhetoric of the PRS has 
penetrated and depoliticised trade unions in line with a broader liberal consensus on 
what constitutes an effective strategy of poverty reduction and what role that assigns 
the African workforce. The depoliticisation of previously powerful organisations is 
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exemplified by the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions which was renamed the ‘Civil 
Society for Poverty Reduction’ and cautioned its members against collective action 
which would disrupt the processes and policies of the PRS (Egulu, 2004: 10). Labour, 
therefore, has an exploited and nuanced role within the PRS. The World Bank 
advocates worker solidarity as a means of security for the poor, while simultaneously 
attempting to depoliticise the production relations of the formal sector so as to provide 
a ‘stable’ environment for private investment (World Bank, 1995: 75).  
 
Institutionalising the PRS: Restructuring Governance 
 
In the PRS sustaining capitalist accumulation requires a structure of governance in 
sub-Saharan Africa that provides both a stable macroeconomic environment that is 
conducive to foreign capital investment and also provides for the reproduction of 
labour power and the relations of production. Within the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) the African state is redefined according to two dynamics. The first is 
the false dichotomy between state and market. The second is the reconfiguration of 
the boundaries between national sovereignty and the World Bank in heavily-indebted 
countries. The reliance of Africa governments on debt-relief facilitates the Bank in  
re-constituting the mandate of the state and the purpose and form of representation. 
These two interrelated processes constitute the second component to transforming the 
social relations of sub-Saharan Africa: the restructuring of governance. 
 
The reconstituted role of the state within African political economies under the PRS 
cannot be reduced to a binary relationship of retrenchment between state and market. 
The state and market are not independent entities but interconnected institutional 
systems through which discordant economic and political interests are pursued and 
manifest. The World Bank’s re-configuration of the African state ostensibly seeks to 
enhance its capacity to intervene in the economy on behalf of private capital, 
particularly large-scale international capital. The divestment of state-owned 
enterprises and marketised delivery of basic services such as water, public transport 
and health care are all components of this reconfiguration. Complicating this dynamic 
is the fragmentation of political authority and multiplicity of power relations that 
determine the institutional composition of heavily-indebted political economies in 
Africa. The ambiguities of sovereignty and governance in Africa’s heavily-indebted 
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states are a product of contestation not only between the IFIs and national 
governments but also between political elites, Non-Government Organisations, and 
bilateral donors pursuing varied interests and developmental outcomes. Public 
authority in the political economies of sub-Saharan Africa is disjointed, 
transnationalised and diversified. Social spaces and relations are governed through the 
actions of a variety of actors operating domestically and internationally. The PRS 
provides an overlapping framework of authority, which encompasses the African 
nation-state, the IFIs, and local non-state actors (Cox & Schechter, 2002: 86) This 
overlapping framework is facilitated by the inability of most heavily-indebted states 
to reconcile the disjuncture between national economies and domestic political 
authority. The inability of African states to reproduce the conditions and relations of 
production means that African states are “no longer the point of condensation for all 
sets of social relations” (Robinson, 2004: 143; Poulantzas, 2000: 185) 
 
The dichotomy between promoting accumulation and legitimisation is manifest both 
at the level of the state and the transnational level of the World Bank (O’Connor, 
1973: 6). The World Bank pursues the expansion of capitalist accumulation 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa as a means of expanding the spatial limits of the 
global market (Harvey, 2011: 185). This programme necessitates legitimacy and 
authority at the level of the nation-state. Although African states are characterised as 
extraverted, sourcing their political authority and economic strength from exogenous 
actors, their role is central in the establishment of a socio-legal structure that 
guarantees property rights and facilitates the sphere of exchange. The dependence of 
heavily-indebted African countries on the debt relief afforded by the IFIs enables 
these institutions to exert a degree of direct influence in approving budget ceilings, 
inflation rates and export quotas through the PRSP. Nevertheless, the concept of 
‘trans-national governance’ in Africa emphasised by Dingwerth (2008: 607) is 
problematic, and does not sufficiently acknowledge the role of representation and 
sovereignty that differentiates the PRS from previous modalities of debt-relief and 
development. The depoliticised parlance of the PRS serves to incorporate and 
transform, but not replace, the state in Africa. An accurate conception of the global 
structure of accumulation requires a theoretical acknowledgment that transnational 
institutions, such as the World Bank, strongly condition – but do not autonomously 
determine – state and policy formation in Africa’s poorest nations.   
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Rather than ‘territorialising’ PRSPs to the specific composition and requirements of 
each African political economy, the World Bank’s institutionalisation of the PRS has 
led to a proliferation of ‘governance states’. In these social formations the fragility of 
democratic politics and “largesse of external agencies produce the ‘grease’ that allows 
African elites to embrace the PRS governance model as part of their own desires for 
enrichment and social ascendance” (Harrison, 2004: 129). A ‘performance’ of 
partnership on behalf of both national elites - pursuing debt relief -  and the World 
Bank – which pursues more intrusive conditionality – is a key determining factor in 
the inefficacy of the PRS strategy. Although the PRS’s stated purpose is progressive it 
operates within a complex milieu of power relations at all levels of the global political 
economy, in which different actors pursue various material and ideological ends, 
ultimately to the disadvantage of the impoverished and marginalised.  
 
The PRS problematises African politics as an inefficient and venal conduit for the 
complex dialectic between coercion and consent that determines how policies are 
formulated and implemented. The development landscape of African political 
economies is commonly described as one of corruption, tribalism, weak (if not failed) 
states and a pronounced disjuncture between the formal democratic character of 
existing institutions and the lived experience of politics and democracy. The nature of 
the African state and its relation to civil society are identified as a central concern in 
the PRS (White, 1994: 375; Harbeson et al, 1994: 14). A prosaic conclusion is that 
without measures to correct the weakness of African states and the vacuity of 
representative institutions, development failure is inevitable (Beckman, 1993: 20; 
Idoniboye-Obu & Uzodkie, 2013: 21). 
 
Central governments in sub-Saharan Africa are considered cumbersome and 
unresponsive to the needs of all but a socio-political elite (Mozaffar, 2002: 87). The 
prevalence of patrimonialism in political office, land titles and social relations is a 
direct contradiction of the socio-legal framework of the state which is promoted in the 
PRS (Williams, 2010: 409). The client-patron relations that characterise African 
politics have been strengthened by the influx of concessional finance and foreign aid, 
creating a network of beneficiaries surrounding central finance ministries who vie for 
a share of the benefits (Wunsch, 2000: 129). The PRS attempt to overcome the venal 
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relations of politics in African by the pre-agreed three year budget models which 
guaranteed the allocation of funds as a conditionality.  
 
Underpinning the World Bank’s strategy to transform African politics is the role of a 
de-politicised and informed civil society that is capable of dismantling political 
relations of largesse and demanding reform and representation in line with the 
demarcated agenda approved within the PRS (Konings, 2011: 31). The World Bank’s 
‘culturalist’ assumptions of political office in Africa informs its strategy to overcome 
corruption and clientelism. These two prevailing features mean that the African state 
is both insufficiently autonomous from society to enact drastic reform and, 
simultaneously, too venal and unresponsive to the desires of civil society to provide 
representative democratic institutions (Williams, 2010: 404). This situation is directly 
opposed to the dichotomous role of the state as envisaged in liberal theory which must 
reconcile the tension of being both representative and autonomous from civil society 
(Williams, 2010: 405; Owusu, 2003: 1659). 
 
The role of a depoliticised civil society in the transformation of African politics is 
paramount to the PRS. According to the World Bank, civil society can serve to 
lighten the “burden of the state, by involving citizens and communities in the delivery 
of collective goods” (World Bank, 1997: 3, emphasis my own). In this statement 
‘involving’ appears to be a euphemism for an increasing array of ‘user-pays’ policies 
regarding the delivery of social services, expanding formal labour markets to enhance 
tax revenue and disciplining the poorest citizens into stringent and intrusive assistance 
and administrative measures (Ruiters, 2007: 504). The attendant policies of 
decentralisation and participation are designed to co-opt and convince civil society 
and NGOs that greater democracy and market-oriented reform are symbiotic, and thus 
exert pressure on African states to deliver more accountable and transparent 
government, provide ‘efficient’ social services, and share the cost of delivery with 
those receiving the service (Cammack, 2004: 199). However, the expanded role of 
civil society is not designed to promote public discourse and debate regarding the 
efficacy and benefits of the PRS but to challenge the ‘traditional’ and ‘cultural’ 
characteristics of the African state which are perceived as impediments to growth.  
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Despite the deepening of neoliberal conditionality through ‘technologies of agency’, 
the PRS attempts to more overtly discipline African states to the structure promoted 
by the World Bank through two interrelated processes. First, the increasingly 
liberalised and privatised macroeconomic framework agreed upon in PRSPs grants 
foreign financial capital heightened power over the African state and labour (Gill, 
1995: 400; Brenner, 1998: 459-61). The ascendancy of foreign financial capital in 
determining the priorities of the state and structure of African political economies is 
concomitant with the increasingly free flow of capital through the region and the 
threat that ‘capital flight’ poses to unstable or protectionist structures of governance 
(Bakker & Gill, 2006: 43).  
 
Second, the PRS is able to discipline indebted African administrations by traditional 
conditional debt-relief and finance. The rhetorical commitment to national ownership 
in the PRS is reduced to a brief consultation with selected government and non-
government figures, with final approval of the strategy and attendant debt relief left to 
the IFIs.  The restricted purview of policy choices and deliberative processes outlined 
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Sourcebooks discipline African countries within a 
demarcated agenda of ‘market fundamnetalism’, atomised representation and export 
oriented growth (Klugman 2002a; Klugman, 2002b). The role of the state is thus 
reduced to a “partner, catalyst and facilitator” of private interests and the market as a 
means of distribution maintaining the institutional and socio-legal framework to 
enforce these norms (World Bank, 1997:1). The encapsulating term for the role of the 
state within the PRS is ‘good governance’ (World Bank, 2012: 19). 
 
The amorphous priority of ‘good governance’ provides criteria by which the IFIs can 
judge the alignment of national policy with their own strategies. ‘Good governance’ is 
ultimately a mode of conditionality designed to operationalise the restructuring of 
African politics according to particular criteria. The liberal principles that underpin 
this normative prescription include reducing corruption, strengthening accountability, 
fostering public discourse and nurturing a free press (World Bank, 1989: 6). Foremost 
among the principles of good governance is the “creation, protection, and 
enforcement of property rights, without which the scope of market transactions is 
limited”. The PRS’s promotion of liberal governance is premised on the interrelation 
between individualised property rights and greater capital accumulation. The 
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principles of equality under the law and freedom to act as “independent economic 
operators” are inextricably linked to the practices and ethos of generalised commodity 
exchange which the PRS aims to facilitate in Africa. This connection was clearly 
articulated by Marx who wryly commented on the sphere of commodity exchange as 
“the exclusive realm of freedom …  because both buyer and seller of a commodity are 
determined by free will” and equality “because each enters into a relation with the 
other …  as they exchange equivalent for equivalent” (Marx, 1976: 280). Marx’s 
critique of the bourgeois pre-occupation with the sphere of exchange demonstrates the 
inadequate understanding of the sphere of production in the liberal governance 
promoted in the PRS. The reconfiguration of the state to enshrine the exchange of 
commodities – both domestically in terms of land and labour and internationally in 
the exportation of unprocessed goods – necessarily overlooks the exploitation of 
labour inherent in the relations of production in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, 
imposition of a liberal state in Africa reflects global rather than national accumulation 
priorities, facilitating the exploitation of African labour by foreign capital without 
enabling the state to utilise the greater circulation of capital to pursue developmental 
goals and benefit its citizens (Tickell & Peck, 2003: 163). 
 
Conclusion: Limitations to Implementation   
 
The conditions and pre-requisites of sustaining capital accumulation require a 
transformation of existing institutional mechanisms in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Operationalising the process of poverty reduction as envisaged by the World Bank 
requires the implementation of policies designed to facilitate capital accumulation. As 
such, the PRS aims to re-create the conditions associated with endogenous capitalism: 
dispossessing the African population of the means of subsistence and commodifying 
their labour within an expanded market.. However, the extraverted nature of African 
political economies means that expansion of the formal labour market is incumbent 
on the exigencies of foreign finance capital, and as such has developed in a way that 
benefits global accumulation circuits at the expense of increased national 
accumulation. The failure of the PRS to conceptualise the exploitative relations in 
Africa inhibits the pursuit of successful proletarianisation and capitalist development. 
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Furthermore, the PRS re-constitutes the state in Africa as a means of facilitating and 
sustaining capital accumulation. The PRS aims to implement a liberal form of 
governance to transform and overcome the perceived impediments of clientelist 
African politics. The state is disciplined both through inclusive participation in the 
PRSPs and through its requirement for financial capital and debt-relief. The 
reconstitution of the state, and institutionalisation of a socio-legal structure that 
enshrines private property rights, is not premised on a territorialised conception of the 
impediments to capitalist development that are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Rather it is based on a universal implementation of ‘market fundamentalism’ and 
liberal governance to facilitate capital accumulation, regardless of its benefits for 
national political economies or their impoverished citizens.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Impediments Confronting the PRS: realities of the African 
Periphery 
 
Despite the institutional reconstitution of labour and the state and the 
extensive implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Holvoet et al, 2012: 749), the reduction of absolute poverty and promotion of 
sustained economic growth remains limited and incomplete (Appendix Five: Average 
Change in National Poverty Rates, World Bank, 2014). Engaging with the seemingly 
technical questions of policy design is a common preoccupation of those trying to 
explain such outcomes (Gottschalk, 2005: 419; Levy & Kpundeh, 2004: 3) but this 
focus is insufficient to address the impediments to growth in the region. The failure to 
achieve sustained poverty reduction can be better understood by examining the 
tensions and contradictions between the PRS and the empirical specificity of the 
political economies in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter highlights the deficiencies of 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) project for poverty reduction by 
foregrounding the distinctive process of capitalist production and accumulation in 
Africa. It demonstrates the structural and historical impediments to growth that are 
integral to the failures of capitalism in Africa and impede the PRS.  
 
The chapter first examines Africa’s unique mode of accumulation and ‘grafted’ 
capitalism. Extending this analysis, the second section draws upon Samir Amin’s 
(1982) distinction between ‘articulated’ and ‘disarticulated’ economies to elucidate 
the dichotomy between production and consumption, and between sectors, and 
applies these to sub-Saharan political economies. These two key facets of African 
political economies are then used to understand an inter-related set of impediments to 
sustained growth and poverty reduction encompassing land tenure, informality, 
industry, and the role of financial capital. This analysis demonstrates that the 
predominance of the World Bank, in determining Africa’s development agenda has 
obscured the importance of empirical specificity regarding Africa’s peripheral 
relations within international capitalism and the absence of sectoral linkages which 
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determine – and are determined by – the extent and form of production relations in the 
region.    
 
Accumulation and Africa’s ‘Grafted’ Capitalism 
 
The capitalist logic of accumulation and the territorial logic of state administration 
were both introduced to Africa by colonial occupation (Brenner, 1998: 459). Partial 
primitive accumulation in much of the region was achieved by direct dispossession of 
the indigenous population, establishing regimes capable of expropriating value 
without exchange (Legassick, 1974: 253; Moore, 2004: 90). Marx’s schema required 
primitive accumulation as a prior condition to a fully functioning capitalist system. In 
sub-Saharan Africa however, primitive accumulation was incomplete or applied only 
to ‘enclaves’ of colonial administration or particular natural resource wealth (Arrighi 
et al, 2010: 414). The result of this process is, as discussed in Chapter Three, the 
semi-proletarianisation of much of sub-Saharan Africa - with migratory ‘informal’ 
labour and subsistence agriculture blurring the ‘binary’ distinctions between rural and 
urban or capitalist and peasant production. This unique and incomplete character of 
capitalism has shaped debates regarding the extent of African capitalism since the 
post-independence period in Africa (1950s-1960s). ‘Accumulation by dispossession’ 
continues to dictate the governance and administration of capitalism in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Harvey, 2009: 63; Arrighi et al, 2010). The expansion of markets for labour 
and land, commoditisation of previously non-pecuniary areas (including tribal culture 
and wildlife for tourism) and the privatisation of social services, are all underpinned 
by a logic of dispossession to facilitate an expanded realm of production and 
exchange (Ruiters, 2007: 487).  
 
Alongside this mode of accumulation by dispossession is the complementary 
capitalist logic of growth, which is maintained by widespread commodity exchange 
and the integration of production in African economies with global commodity 
circuits (Iyayi, 1986: 29-30). In the vast majority of countries there is a narrow and 
disjointed production base with ill-adapted technology, poor manufacturing 
capabilities, declining share in international markets and lethargic growth (Collier & 
Venables, 2007: 1332; Ndlela, 2007: 87). The partial capitalist mode of production 
present in most African economies is ‘grafted’ to pre-capitalist forms of production in 
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a distorted manner. This form of capitalism has not transformed the political economy 
as a whole, thus failing to produce dynamic growth and development. It remains 
totally dependent on external factors such as markets in, and capital from, the global 
political economy (Ndlela, 2007: 88). The endogenous capitalist mode of production 
arose out of the European feudal ‘cradle of capitalism’ which provided the social 
foundations for the transition towards extensive commodification of capital, labour, 
consumption and market penetration in the entire mode of production (Pellicani, 
1994: 109; Ndlela, 2007: 88). In endogenous capitalism, the majority of production 
was geared to the output of commodities, so the impetus of the industrial revolution 
was able to significantly alter the social relations of society to sustain capitalist 
growth. But in contemporary African political economies, where the commodified 
formal sector is limited to enclaves, a development trajectory that aims to increase 
productivity has not produced a concomitant transformation in social relations or 
attracted sufficient investment to provide employment to a greater proportion of the 
informal workforce (Wilkinson & Webster, 1982: 2). The incomplete nature of 
African capitalist relations, and the barriers this presents to accumulation, are 
exacerbated by the phenomenon of structural disarticulation which characterises sub-
Saharan political economies.  
 
Structural Disarticulation in Africa: Domestic and International Origins 
 
Samir Amin (1982; 205; 2011: 229) was among the first to describe ‘structural 
disarticulation’ in the African context. African political economies are responsive to 
the accumulation needs and crises of the developed ‘core’ countries, a relationship 
that manifests itself in a host of distortions and dislocations in the political economies 
of the African periphery (Heintz, 2010: 267). For Amin, a developed or ‘articulated’ 
economy is one where the production of capital goods and consumption are primary 
and linked. However, the predominant linkages in the ‘disarticulated’ economies of 
the African periphery are between the production of basic commodities and the export 
sector (Amin, 2011: 230). A disarticulated economy is, therefore, one whose 
constituent parts are not complementary, as compared to a coherent economy where 
there are domestic, as well as regional and sectoral complementarities. These 
reciprocities are facilitated by a pervasive commodification and an articulated system 
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of forward and backward linkages of production and consumption (Hirschman, 1958: 
117).  
 
The structural constraints to sustained growth in sub-Saharan Africa are manifest in 
global, as well as domestic relations. High levels of commodification in developed 
capitalist economies, pressures from industrialisation and falling domestic rates of 
profit necessitate the expansion of capitalist accumulation through trade with the 
African formal sector (Brenner & Theodore, 2002: 350; Shivji, 2008: 55). The legacy 
of colonial trading relations which necessitated only a minimal development of 
infrastructure and ancillary services continues to be maintained in formal sector 
‘enclaves’ surrounding natural resource extraction and plantation based agriculture 
(e.g. the ‘copperbelt’ in Zambia [Negi, 2010] or Cocoa plantations in Ghana’s Ashanti 
region [Tiffen et al, 2004]). Forward and backward linkages between these enclaves 
and other economic sectors are minimal and are directed, almost exclusively towards 
foreign export markets (Cramer, 1999: 1247). 
  
The benefits from this transfer are realised in developed political economies – in 
higher profits for capital and higher wages for labour in developed countries with 
sufficient social organisation to demand them. The balance between the reward for 
labour and the development of the forces of production operates at a global level 
(Cox, 1987: 14). The structural systems of price in peripheral African countries are 
predominantly divorced from determinants such as productivity, and are instead 
governed by international systems of ‘value’ (Chase-Dunn, 1998: 57-8). This is 
evinced by the relative disparity between distribution of value added per worker in the 
centre (which is narrow) and the same distribution for workers in the periphery 
(which is dispersed) (Amin, 2011: 254; Appendix Six : Manufacturing Value added as 
a Percentage of GDP, World Bank, 2014; Appendix Seven: Agricultural value added 
per worker, World Bank, 2014). In the developed economies, wages and incomes 
necessarily increase according to the rate of productivity. In the disarticulated African 
model however, the remuneration of labour is decoupled from increases in 
productivity and growth (Amin, 2011: 218). Alain de Janvry concisely defines this 
contradiction:  
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 “the key difference between social articulation and disarticulation thus 
originates in the sphere of circulation – in the geographical and social location of the 
market for the modern sector. Under social articulation, market expansion originates 
principally in rising national wages; under disarticulation, it originates either abroad 
or in profits and rents” (1981: 384).  
 
The international transfer of values is reinforced by the language of the PRS. 
References to “enhancing international competitiveness” and the rationality of “world 
market prices” in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are ubiquitous and 
suggest a theoretical misconception of the disparity in international capitalist relations 
(Government of Ghana & IMF, 2010: 21, 6; Kingdom of Lesotho & IMF, 2012: xi, 
26). These prices are determined by disparate centre-periphery relations and are 
detached from internal conditions such as productivity or the exploitation of labour 
(Kiely, 1998: 63; Amin, 2011: 253). The transfer of value from the African periphery 
to the developed ‘core’ is manifest in unequal exchange, but has its origin in the 
conditions of production and exploitation of labour in Africa itself (Gibbon, 2005: 36; 
Amin, 2011: 253). 
 
More Than Just Markets: Impediments to Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The unequal transfer of value that defines Africa’s peripheral status in the 
international market is founded on the extent of capitalism and disarticulation of the 
political economies that comprise the region. The formal sector of most African 
economies is interlinked through various forms of infrastructure (roads, rail, 
telecommunications) designed to facilitate trade through exports. Yet domestically 
consumption between the different sectors is not linked (Morris et al, 2012: 408; 
Adera, 1995: 5). Firstly, there is a disarticulation between the structure of production 
and the structure of consumption (Shivji, 2008: 59). Encouraged into a regime of 
export-oriented growth by the PRSP, Africa continues to export a large proportion of 
its primary commodities (coffee, cocoa, diamonds, copper) without a significant 
regional or domestic market for these goods (Daviron & Gibbon, 2002: 141). The 
disarticulation between consumption and production in most African economies has 
its origin in trade liberalisation reform promoted by the IFIs in the 1980s. The primary 
focus of these policies remains the balance of trade, rather than the relationship 
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between the allocation of imports and economic development. Consequently, primary 
exports are prioritised and a substantial proportion of imports into Africa are 
consumer goods, rather than capital goods or intermediates that might allow for 
diversification or deeper industrialisation (Owusu, 2003: 1655; Taylor, 1988: 27). The 
availability of aid and debt-relief has frequently fuelled surges in consumption in 
Africa, often construed as promising growth but failing to sustain capital 
accumulation (Collier & Gunning, 1992: 925). Compounding this imbalance, the vast 
majority of imported consumer goods are delivered to the urban and elite markets 
satisfying demand for international products (De Janvry & Garramón, 1977: 29).  
 
The reduction of local markets for domestic manufactured goods, due to importing 
firms working with vast economies of scale, and the lack of value-adding industries 
for agricultural products, presents a serious impediment to the development of 
capitalism in Africa (Daviron & Gibbon, 2002: 137-8; Tiffen, 2003: 1344). 
Importantly, this is an area which is central to the PRS agenda, exemplified in the 
2008 World Development Report Agriculture for Development which asserts that the 
“agribusiness chain” can be supported by promoting investment in the “backward 
linkages to smallholders”, provision of infrastructure which facilitates higher yields 
and more efficient agricultural-industry links through “electrification”, “domestic 
fertilizer production” and “mobility support” (World Bank, 2013: 6, 18). However, 
these laudable objectives are subsumed by the proliferation of transnational cash crop 
enterprises which have precipitated a “scramble for land” in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Carmody, 2011: 14; Bryceson, 2002a: 725). The victims of this trend are the rural 
populations who see small-holdings purchased for plantations which cultivate palm 
oil, maize and sugarcane (Van de Walle, 2009: 311; Bryceson, 1996: 97). Moyo, 
Yeros, and Jha (2013) point to the exportation of basic commodities and proliferation 
of lucrative cash crop agriculture as precipitating wide-scale primitive accumulation, 
displacing producers from the land, drastically altering food chains and integrating the 
sub-Saharan periphery with the “Atlantic agro-industrial complex” (Moyo, Jha, 
Yeros, 2013: 94). The nutritional needs of the wider population are in the most part 
met by subsistence production, foreign imports and food aid (Bevan et al, 1991). 
There are competing demands for rural labour between food and cash crops which are 
exported. Often, the wages of cash crop agriculture take precedence over subsistence 
agriculture as commodity needs are more diverse than food (Bryceson, 2002b: 3-4). 
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Food shortages – of both quantity and nutrition – are typically addressed by food aid 
from western donors which in turn destroy domestic markets and reinforce 
dependency (Friedmann, 1993: 51; Sen, 1981: 433).  
 
The role of capital in the market is often contradictory and detrimental to the 
immediate and long-term needs of the poor, evinced by the proliferation of cash crop 
agriculture and imported consumer goods. The World Bank conception of poverty 
reduction as the creation and expansion of formal labour markets – aimed at 
incentivising foreign direct investment with low wages and overheads – misconstrues 
the broader structural distortions that impede capitalist accumulation in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Government of Tanzania and IMF, 2006: 7; Moore, 2004: 87). The promotion 
of a formal sector which is geared to the exportation of basic commodities, and the 
entrenchment of detrimental terms of trade with other developed and developing 
regions, is a programme which perpetuates these conditions, providing limited 
opportunity for the creation of domestic value chains that engage a larger proportion 
of the population (Amin, 2003: 3). As such, the PRS’s promotion of integration of 
formal sectors with the international market appears to serve the continuation of a 
peripheral position for Africa within the global social structure of accumulation, with 
little opportunity for the forward and backward linkages required to promote broad-
based, incremental advances in economic indices and social well-being (Heintz, 2010: 
267; Kotz & McDonough, 2010: 95).  
 
The informal sector comprises the non-formal and communal sectors and is not linked 
beneficially to the formal sector, though it contributes significantly to survival and a 
continuation of people’s economic and social well-being (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012: 
264-269). In many African economies, informal sector business may generate as 
much as half of Gross National Product (GNP) and support between 60 to 70% of the 
population (ILO, 2013: 196-201). Recent research demonstrates that attempts to 
‘formalise’ or embed capitalist social relations along the “continuum” of informal or 
communal economic activity have not facilitated a shift of urban and rural workers 
towards more administrated and formalised occupations (Jütting & Laiglesia, 2009; 
Adams et al, 2013: 18). The ‘self-employed’ labour in the informal sector produces 
cheap wage goods thereby satisfying demand from formally employed workers with 
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low dispensable income (Benjamin & Mbaye, 2012: 120; Shivji, 2008: 67) The cheap 
supply of labour and subsistence provision of food from informal and communal 
economic activity serves to support the project of integrating the formal sector of 
African economies with international markets. A good example of this can be found 
in Tanzania, where the migration of rural youths known as wamachinga, who become 
street hawkers in the cities, are in effect, subsidising the costs of circulation of 
commodities in Dar es Salaam and thereby enhancing the profits of merchant capital, 
which is registered as an encouraging sign of ‘growth’ and accumulation by the 
World Bank (Shivji, 2008: 50; Liviga & Mekacha, 1998: 40-42). In fact, the 
prevalence of the informal sector can be seen as a physical manifestation of the 
disjuncture between the factors that separate African communities from the land (such 
as individualised land tenure and the predominance of plantation agriculture) and the 
limited efficacy of stimulating economic growth and higher employment by 
prioritising primary un-processed exports (Wilkinson & Webster, 1982: 2; Benjamin 
& Mbaye, 2012: 97; Appendix Eight: Informal Economy as a Percentage of GDP, 
Schneider et al, 2010;  Appendix Nine: Wage and Salaried workers as a Percentage of 
Total Employment, World Bank, 2012). The distinction between the formal and 
informal sector and its normalised role in the reproduction of a disarticulated and 
disconnected political economy has only recently begun to be acknowledged by the 
World Bank (see for example Fox, 2011 or Benjamin et al, 2014). However, the 
necessity of engaging with the structures and dynamics of this sector as a means of 
development rather than an impediment remains absent from the emerging IFI 
discourse on this prevalent demographic. 
 
In addition to this disarticulation between formal and informal labour, the role that 
financial capital plays in sub-Saharan Africa is also discordant with the PRSPs 
conflation of poverty reduction and global circuits of accumulation. Since the 
implementation of structural adjustment policies, trade liberalisation has been 
complemented by financial liberalisation. The inflow of financial capital was 
absorbed primarily for non-productive investments such as speculative real estate and 
financial markets (Bayoumi & MacDonald, 1995: 552). Thus ‘credit booms’ in sub-
Saharan Africa are commonly accompanied by ‘investment booms’ in speculative 
markets and consumption of imported goods (IMF, 1995: 67).  The booms are driven 
by new forms of comprador capital in subordinate, but mutually advantageous, 
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relationships with foreign financial capital. The “bureaucratic class” accumulates 
rents in the forms of corruption and bribes by alienating public resources (Wunsch, 
2000: 135). The profits from mining, agriculture and construction enterprises are 
rarely productively invested or communicated in higher wages, but are either 
expatriated to foreign markets or sequestered by domestic elites in speculative 
activities, especially burgeoning real estate markets.  
 
The physical manifestation of the prevalent compradorial class can be seen in Africa’s  
rapidly expanding cities. Dar es Salaam, has an established class of wajisiriamali 
entrepreneurs who specialise in investments in the speculative real estate market. This 
market is driven by the supply of capital rather than a demand for housing and the 
result is an increasingly urbanised city centre surrounded by an increasing population 
of unsheltered citizens who occupy vast shanty town slums (Briggs & Mwamfupe, 
1999: 272) Obeng-Odoom, 2013: 425). The ‘booms’ in the real estate market which 
facilitated this urbanisation are decoupled from the demands of the citizens who 
reside in the city. The supply of financial capital that is a primary consideration in the 
PRS, creates a speculative, rather than a needs-based, level of demand and this is 
demonstrated by the ad-hoc provision of infrastructural requirements (gas, electricity, 
water and transport) which are too dilapidated and inadequate to support high rise 
buildings (Gough & Yankson, 2000: 2485). The expansion of the speculative real 
estate market in many African cities demonstrates a disarticulation between need and 
demand for housing, and a demonstration of the ways in which the liberalisation of 
capital and precedence of markets has not delivered developmentally beneficial 
outcomes because of the specificity of African class dynamics. While the expansion 
of the urban real estate market in African cities such as Accra and Dar es Salaam is 
seized upon as a “natural by-product of emerging market growth” the empirical 
reality is that compradorial capital is displacing many poor urban residents and 
leading to a proliferation of slums which are the antithesis of an environment within 
which greater well-being and prosperity can be secured  (Davis, 2014).  
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Conclusion: Territorialising the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
 
‘African’ capitalism is an unbalanced and disarticulated structure which has been 
determined by an external imposition of social relations from the colonial period to 
the contemporary development project. Extractive regimes of production absorb the 
majority of capital that has been invested, and the absence of forward and backward 
linkages prohibits the productive employment of a greater proportion of the 
population to create relative surplus value. In addition the surplus that has been 
extracted has been realised in foreign markets, or as profits and rents rather than being 
re-invested. The process of capitalist development, though not reducible to Rostowian 
modernisation trajectories, does require the productive employment of a critical mass 
of the population. The promotion of individualised land tenure, in addition to the 
liberalised movement of foreign financial capital and enterprises has successfully 
dispossessed the vast majority of African’s from the means of subsistence. However 
the absence of concomitant urban or industrial employment is the corollary of 
liberalised trade policies that are implemented as part of the PRSPs. The disarticulated 
structure of African political economies is thus perpetuated. They remain entrenched 
in peripheral relations with the international market supplying basic commodities to 
manufacturing centres across the world and facilitating global accumulation circuits 
with limited means of promoting national development or improving the livelihoods 
of their citizens.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) has 
failed to substantially deliver on its expressed goal of poverty reduction in Africa 
because it pursues a strategy of capitalist accumulation that is antithetical to 
improving the livelihoods of the poor. In doing so, the PRS fails to accurately identify 
the impediments to accumulation, enhanced productivity and increased representation 
posed by the historically specific conditions of the African context. Although the 
global capitalist system has “generated unprecedented wealth and global 
interconnections”, it has done so in a way that exacerbates, rather than addresses, the 
contradictions of capitalism and the exploitative relations which underpin the core-
periphery dynamic (Munck, 2009: 624). The World Bank is the institutional locus for 
contesting and reconciling the contradiction between the capitalist imperative of 
exploitative relations as expressed in the globalised social structure of accumulation, 
and the social imperative of providing the stability and prosperity required to improve 
the livelihoods of the world’s poorest populations (Heintz, 2010: 267). Given the 
unique character of African capitalism and the limits to an export-oriented structure of 
production, the PRS serves to exacerbate the disarticulations of Africa’s political 
economies and perpetuate, rather than address, the existing impediments to growth 
and improved livelihoods 
 
The PRS replaces the overt neoliberalism of the “stabilise, liberalise, privatise” 
mantra with a subtler and seemingly more participatory strategy to pursue the same 
ends. This approach has failed to address the causes of African poverty because it 
does not reconcile the historically specific African conditions with a strategy of 
integration with global circuits of capital (Amin, 2003: 3). Further, the PRS 
disempowers the African poor, promoting their exploitation in a disarticulated market 
located on the periphery of a globalised structure of accumulation as ‘secure’ and 
‘inclusive’ (Arrighi et al, 2010: 411). Simultaneously, it delegitimises their ability to 
collectively gain more democratic representation in the fragmented sphere of African 
governance. 
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A systematic framework has been applied to consider the emergence of the PRS as a 
revised development policy, the ideological and institutional components that 
underpin its implementation, and the discordance between these processes and the 
impediments to growth in sub-Saharan Africa (Kingston et al, 2011: 114). The PRS 
shows little dissimilarity to its forebearers. The continued primacy of ‘market 
fundamentalism’ in the World Bank’s development strategy engenders a reproduction 
of past failings and the PRS deepens and reinforces, rather than disrupts the neoliberal 
trajectory of the World Bank’s development policy over the past 30 years. 
 
While the PRS rhetorically and programmatically emphasises the notions of inclusion, 
empowerment and security, these potentially progressive terms have been adjusted to 
legitimise the ‘inclusive’ neoliberal model of development espoused by the World 
Bank (Porter & Craig, 2004: 402). The PRS has appropriated the principles of ‘civil 
society participation’, ‘country ownership’ and ‘decentralisation’ to embed and 
internalise the disciplines of neoliberal capitalism throughout sub-Saharan Africa 
(Zack-Williams et al, 2006: 502). Furthermore, the commitment to ‘poverty reducing’ 
social policy in the PRSPs is conditioned both at the level of the heavily-indebted 
state and in determining the behaviours of those in extreme poverty. Notions of 
partnership and agency are constrained by the superficial nature of consultation and 
the conditional limits that are placed on acceptable reform (Barrientos, 2010: 18). The 
World Bank’s monopoly on ‘effective’ development knowledge has foreclosed the 
opportunity for both constructive challenges and transformational change to come 
from within sub-Saharan Africa (Cammack, 2007: 196). The conditionality that the 
PRS enforces through debt relief, and the limited extent to which strategies are 
‘territorialised’ and debated is likely to further the trend of heavily-indebted 
“governance states” reconstituted according to the prescriptions of the World Bank 
(Harrison, 2004: 5). 
 
The operationalisation of the PRS through the reconstitution of labour serves to 
exacerbate the disarticulation of African political economies by dispossessing the 
majority of Africans from the means of subsistence without sufficient employment to 
absorb their labour. Further, the restructuring of the state aims to implement a liberal 
form of governance in order to transform and overcome the perceived obstacle that 
‘traditional’ African politics poses to capital accumulation. The implementation of 
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these strategies is disconnected from the extraverted and fragmented reality of African 
political economies.  An exposition of the characteristics and form of capitalism in 
African political economies has demonstrated the tensions inherent in an export 
oriented development strategy. The PRS is aimed at improving the livelihoods of 
those who are exploited by labour relations which are conditioned by Africa’s 
peripheral status in global capitalism (Harvey, 2005: 92). The PRS is only partially 
equipped to explain the persistence of poverty in Africa, as it prioritises the sphere of 
exchange and overlooks the systematic exploitation of African labour by capital that 
is facilitated by its grafted mode of production.  
 
Towards a Genuine Poverty Reduction Strategy? 
 
The journey from analysis to prescription is a problematic one for any political 
economic analysis. However the systematisation of evidence provided in this thesis 
facilitates two wider considerations for the progression of the PRS in the near future.   
First, the prevalence of the ‘inclusive’ neoliberal approach should not be considered 
as a teleological effect of the contradictions inherent in globalised capitalism, rather 
as a manifestation of the contingency and dialectics which shape the World Bank’s 
development agenda (Rückert, 2007: 111). As such, collective resistance to the 
absence of legitimate inclusion and participation in the PRS may facilitate a further 
shift towards a strategy that specifically addresses the needs of the poor and the 
relations of the international capitalist system that peripheralise sub-Saharan Africa. 
The impediments to capitalist development require a solution that is contingent on - 
and specific to - the unbalanced structure and mode of capitalism in African political 
economies. If the PRS is to provide a legitimately representative and nationally-
owned trajectory of development, then it must be adapted to incorporate an 
understanding of production relations and the unique composition of capitalism which 
determine Africa’s relations within the global capitalist system. 
 
Second, the development policy of the IMF and World Bank is increasingly 
confronted by empirical evidence that efforts to build state capacity in conjunction 
with higher and more equitable income distribution may have to originate 
domestically (Levy & Kpundeh, 2004: 6). Furthermore, contingent relationships 
within elite groups (particularly between the interests of state and capital) and 
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relations between African elites and the broader polity are critical considerations 
(Taylor & Nel, 2002: 170). It seems that financing and promoting progressive forms 
of governance and politics to emerge, particularly by acting as a catalyst for new 
configurations of class power will provide the most effect use of international 
development assistance in the near future (Sandbrook, 2011: 415). In this way, the 
route to greater poverty reduction and  ‘good enough’ governance in African 
countries might be through a greater understanding of the imbalances and 
impediments to development in African political economies (Grindle, 2011: 199). The 
prescription of policy and financial assistance on a far broader, and less intrusive 
scale could facilitate an organic and endogenous process of development grounded 
firmly in the historically specific conditions of African political economies. Given the 
multiplicity of social formations and capitalist relations in Africa, future 
developmental strategies should be continually problematised from a contingent, 
empirically specific perspective that accounts for the historical and geographic 
impediments to growth, the social relations which determine distribution, and the 
position of sub-Saharan Africa within the global political economy.  
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Appendix One: Sub-Saharan Africa- Regional Poverty Trend  
Total Number of Poor Increasing/ Percentage of the Population in Poverty Decreasing 
Source: World Bank Databank 2014 
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Appendix Two: Sub-Saharan Africa: Distribution of GDP per Capita (PPP)  
Source: IMF, 2014: 22 
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Appendix Three: The World Bank’s Policy “Review” – Focus on the 1990’s 
Source: Ishikawa,  2002: 5 
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Appendix Four: Tanzanian Civil Soviety Organisation Illustration of Decentralisation  
Source: Cammack 2007: 208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Artist: Masoud. Hakikazi Catalyst  
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Appendix Five: Average Annual Change in National Poverty Rates  
Source: World Bank (2014) Poverty Data bank: 
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/SSA 
 
                                     
 
 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1
Guinea (2003-2012)
Cote d'Ivoire (2002-2008)
Mozambique (2003-2008)
Cameroon (2001-2007)
Madagascar (2001-2005)
Malawi (2004-2010)
Nigeria (2004-2010)
Burkina Faso (2003-2009)
Mauritania (2000-2008)
Togo (2006-2011)
Congo, Rep. (2005-2011)
Swaziland (2001-2010)
Guinea-Bissau (2002-2012)
Senegal (2001-2011)
Ethiopia (1999-2011)
Mali (2001-2010)
Ghana (1998-2006)
Namibia (2004-2009)
Uganda (2002-2009)
South Africa (2000-2006)
Rwanda (2006-2011)
Average annual change in poverty headcount ratios 
(percentage points per year) 
Decrease Increase 
  
 62 
Appendix Six: Manufacturing Value Added as a Percentage of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa and European Union 
Source: World Bank (2014) Data bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS/countries/ZF-EU?display=graph 
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Appendix Seven: Agriculture - Value Added per Worker  
Source: World Bank (2014) Data bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EA.PRD.AGRI.KD/countries/ZF?display=map 
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Appendix Eight: Informal Economy as a Percentage of GNP   
Source: Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro, 2010 
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Appendix Nine: Wage and Salaried Workers as a Percentage of Total Employment 
Source: World Bank 2012 
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